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CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND THE
ANTITRUST AGENCIES’ BI-MODAL
PENALTIES
STEPHEN CALKINS*
I
INTRODUCTION
Mine is a singularly daunting assignment: to discuss individual compared
with entity penalties as tools for encouraging corporate law compliance, to
comment on the relationship between monetary payments as compensation and
deterrence, and to reflect on the role of the private attorney general in the year
2000. In Part II, I briefly discuss some of the principal issues debated by corporate compliance authorities, including some of the issues relevant to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. In Parts III and IV, respectively, I reflect on the deterrence provided by
those agencies, and on their approach to corporate compliance issues. In Part
V, I consider the role of private litigation as a supplement or complement to
federal enforcement of competition and consumer-protection laws. Finally, in
Part VI, and again focusing on competition and consumer protection, I discuss
some modest ways in which our system for deterring corporate wrongdoing
could be improved.
The antitrust agencies employ penalties that are at once of increasing severity and strikingly bi-modal. Defendants in some actions by either agency
may face extremely unpleasant consequences for their wrongdoing, while defendants in other actions may pay little, if any, price. One of the special roles
of private litigation is to supplement agency enforcement, especially where
otherwise there would be no significantly adverse consequences. Other roles
are to identify cases of wrongdoing, to compensate victims, to help legal doctrine evolve, to provide an institutional safety-valve, and to preserve the integrity of an increasingly regulatory system of enforcement. That system could be
improved, I suggest in Part VI, were the agencies to recognize the “externality
benefits” of litigation, to develop “middle ground” civil deterrence, to continue
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to emphasize individual sanctions, and to coordinate the imposition of adverse
consequences to help achieve optimal deterrence.
II
SELECTED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ISSUES
Several issues stand out as particularly relevant when approaching the issue
from the perspective of a recent antitrust and consumer protection enforcer.
A. Individual Liability
1

To address concerns about the wrongdoing of corporations, should individuals, corporations, or both be sanctioned? Judge Richard Posner was an
early voice for penalizing only the corporation. He argued that a corporation
“has effective methods of preventing its employees from committing acts that
2
impose huge liabilities on it.” More recently, the individual-liability side of the
debate has gained popularity. Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell, in particular, have argued persuasively that the state can punish an individual more severely than a firm can, and that relying on firms to punish indi3
viduals may result in insufficient incentives to avoid wrongdoing.
B. Entity Liability
Although one could ask whether entity liability is necessary, given sufficient
individual liability, fairly convincing cases have been made for some form of
entity sanctions. Law professors Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman have
canvassed a variety of reasons: Individuals may be judgment-proof, identifying
and sanctioning individuals may be more costly for the state than the firm, and
4
entities may not respond sufficiently to individual liability. Law and economics professor Thomas S. Ulen has further argued that corporations are not only
in a good position to encourage employees to obey legal commands, but would
face a perverse incentive to encourage law-breaking if they were not subject to
5
the risk of vicarious liability.

1. The term “corporations” is a term of convenience. Little would turn on whether an entity is a
corporation, a partnership, or a limited liability company.
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 226 (1976).
3. See generally Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 437-44 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees
Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 239 (1993). Mark Cohen found that from 1984-90, “individuals [were] prosecuted and convicted for corporate crimes more often when the corporation on whose behalf the crime was committed [could not] afford to compensate for the harm they imposed.” Mark A. Cohen, Theories of Punishment and Empirical Trends in Corporate Criminal Sanctions, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
399, 409 (1996).
4. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 695-96 (1997) (citing, among other sources, Stephen Salzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 421, 428 (1991),
and STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 172-74 (1987)).
5. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Economic Case for Corporate Criminal Sanctioning, in DEBATING
CORPORATE CRIME 117, 133 (William S. Lofquist et al. eds., 1997).
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C. Criminal Liability
Criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing is increasingly common, yet
6
highly controversial. By their actions, elected officials express continued and
increasing support for criminalization. However, scholars express considerable
7
unease about the use of criminal penalties against corporations. Others ex8
press doubts about the use of incarceration as a penalty for white-collar crimes.
Economists question the policy of inflicting a sentence that is costly for society
in absolute expenditures and forgone wealth-creation, when one can impose an
equally onerous fine.
D. Carrots
The federal Sentencing Guidelines have been associated with the increased
use of what are known as “carrots,” in other words, specified rewards for good
9
corporate behavior. The Guidelines provide that corporate penalties can be
reduced if corporations have effective compliance programs or voluntarily re-

6. The history of corporate criminal responsibility is set out in Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate
Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307, 313 (1991) (arguing that civil penalties would have been
fairer and more effective, but, since criminal liability is here to stay, we should recognize it as “a form
of instrumental regulation with which ordinary principles of culpability do not fit”); Michael K. Block,
Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 418
(1991) (arguing that civil enforcement is “just as effective”); John T. Byam, Comment, The Economic
Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582 (1982) (arguing that
criminal sanctions are more expensive and no more effective); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes,
Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing that actions against corporations should
never be criminal); cf. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1997) (arguing that we should rely instead on reformed corporate civil liability).
But cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991) (positing criminal law as a system
of moral education); Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a
Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L.
REV. 793, 886 n.137 (1996) (arguing that corporate criminal liability is neither an accident nor
thoughtless). For a suggestion that enforcement citations may be needed as much to focus attention as
specifically to deter, see Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A
Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 177 (1993). To the extent this theory applies to antitrust, it might call for more less expensive, civil sanctions rather than fewer, presumably
more expensive, criminal ones. See Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 381, 393 (1996) (“Corporate criminal liability
is a legal anomaly, an historical aberration, and a moral abomination.”).
8. See Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
409 (1980) [hereinafter Optimal Sentences]. See generally WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA,
ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM 51-60 (1986) (arguing that incarceration is an inferior penalty); Gary
S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 193-98, 208 (1968).
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997). The origins and basic approach of the
corporate sentencing guidelines are set out in Liene Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some
Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205 (1993); see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1645-53 (1990) (explaining the modified due diligence defense,
which would prevent criminal liability, findings of recklessness, and most impositions of punitive damages, and which also would influence tort findings of whether an employee’s conduct was within the
scope of his or her employment).
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10

port the wrong. Some commentators have objected to the entire carrot ap11
proach. Others have fretted that the corporate compliance programs contemplated by the Guidelines will be ineffective unless the fruits of self-inspection
12
are immunized or good conduct is otherwise rewarded. Arlen and Kraakman
argue that a composite of strict liability and duty-based liability is the ideal way
to deter corporate wrongdoing and provide incentives for monitoring, investi13
gating, and reporting violations.
III
DETERRENCE BY THE ANTITRUST DIVISION AND THE FTC
Stepping back from such global issues and considering the penalties sought
and imposed by the Antitrust Division and the FTC, two observations leap out.
First, penalties for what might be termed “hard core” violations of laws enforced by those agencies have risen substantially. Second, and in part as a result of this, the agencies employ a strikingly discontinuous set of penalties.
A. Increase in Penalties
Antitrust has seen a remarkable increase in authorized penalties. What was
once a wrist-slap, or a ticket to be paid while continuing to err, is now a potentially substantial penalty. Consider the increase in possible penalties for hardcore price fixing:
10. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f), (g) (1991) (amended 1995). An
“effective” compliance program is one that “has been reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct,” id. § 8A1.2
cmt. 3(k), although the concept of an effective yet unsuccessful compliance program seems a tad
anomalous.
11. See, e.g., Block, supra note 7, at 407 (objecting to what he saw as a move to a negligence standard that would result in inefficiently low industry-wide penalties (and prices) by mitigating penalties
when precautions were taken,); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “Carrot and Stick” Sentencing: Structuring Incentives for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 126 (1990) (expressing reservations).
12. See, e.g., Stephen M. Axinn, The Benefits of “Gold Star” Environmental Compliance: The Need
for a Self-Audit Privilege, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 221 (1996); Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King,
Policing Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7
(1997) (proposing legislation granting immunity); Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731 (1996)
(arguing that due diligence should prevent liability); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate
Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 605 (1995) (arguing that corporate compliance programs should prevent liability);
Note, Growing the Carrot: Encouraging Effective Corporate Compliance, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1783,
1794-95 (1996); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 445 (1981) (arguing that “due
diligence” should be a “sentencing consideration” but not a “defense”; also calling for creative use of
probation).
13. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 4. Chancellor Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), provided an additional, and potentially powerful, incentive for monitoring when, relying in part on the Sentencing Guidelines, he concluded that “a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with
applicable legal standards.” Id. at 970.
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1890: Sherman Act was passed. Violation is a misdemeanor, subject to up
14
to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine for individuals and corporations.
1955: Maximum fine for violating the Sherman Act was increased to
$50,000.
1974: Violations became felonies; maximum incarceration time increased
from one year to three years; maximum fine raised from $50,000 to $100,000
15
(individuals) and $1 million (corporations).
1977: Department of Justice Sentencing Guidelines said the “base period”
recommended sentence for a Sherman Act conviction will be eighteen
16
months.
1984: Fine for individuals raised to $250,000, and, for entities and individuals, the fine may be the greatest of that figure or twice the defendant’s gross
17
gain or victims’ loss.
1987: Federal case sentencing became subject to the Sentencing Reform Act
18
19
of 1984; the Sentencing Guidelines further increased the possible penalties.
1990: The maximum fine was increased to $10 million for entities and
$350,000 for individuals.
1991: Corporate sentencing guidelines take effect, further increasing poten20
tial fines.
1998: The Division is expected to ask Congress to increase the maximum
21
corporate fine from $10 million to $100 million.
Average imposed corporate fines jumped in 1977 and again in 1990, rose
22
thereafter, and soared in 1997. If recent cases are indicative of the future,

14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990).
15. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Congress’s 1974 expression of interest in larger penalties
stimulated judges to impose increased penalties even for misdemeanors, for which maximum penalties
had not been changed. See Mark A. Cohen, The Role of Criminal Sanctions in Antitrust Enforcement,
7 CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES 36, 42 (1989).
16. The Guidelines also indicated that a base level individual fine would be $50,000, but “[f]ines
are usually poor alternatives to prison sentences and should be used and viewed only as a second
choice.” 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,115.
17. Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (1986) (repealed in 1987); Criminal
Fines Improvement Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1994) (reauthorizing this potentially significant
alternative maximum fine). The Division has relied on this authorization nine times to achieve fines of
greater than $10 million. See Gary R. Spratling, Remarks Before the National Institute on White
Collar Crime(Mar. 6, 1998), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1583.htm>).
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86 (1994).
19. See Judy Whalley, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting (Mar. 22, 1990), in 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50,035, at ¶¶ 48,653-54.
20. The 1991 revised Guidelines, in general, reduced potential individual fines and increased individual potential jail sentences, and established complicated corporate penalty calculations. See
ANTITRUST SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 715-16 (4th ed.
1997).
21. See Justice Plans to Ask Congress to Hike Maximum Fines for Sherman Act Offenses, 73 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 353 (Oct. 9, 1997); Gary R. Spratling, Are the Recent Titanic Fines in
Antitrust Cases Just the Tip of the Iceberg, Remarks Before the 12th Annual National Institute on
White Collar Crime 14 (Mar. 6, 1998), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/1583.htm>
(explaining the Division’s support of this proposal).
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23

corporate fines are likely to remain high.
Individual fines, which are deemphasized by the Division, do not appear to have followed any particular pat24
tern. Average jail time per individual sentenced exceeded three months in
only six of the years before 1989, and the average jail time imposed exceeded

22. As reported in, Joseph C. Gallo et al., The First Century of Justice Antitrust Enforcement
(1998) (unpublished manuscript), before 1977, average antitrust fines per firm equaled or exceeded
$72,000 (in 1982 dollars) only once. Since 1977, average antitrust fines exceeded $110,000 (in 1982
dollars) in every year. Average antitruct fines per firm rose sharply during the 1990s, as shown in the
following table:
Fiscal Year

Total Fines (in thousands)

Number

Average (in thousands)

1990

22,658

73

310.4

1991

17,573

55

319.5

1992

22,430

45

498.4

1993

40,427

64

631.7

1994

38,996

59

660.9

1995

40,222

32

1256.9

1996

25,245

31

814.8

1997

203,931

30

6,797.7

Source: ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD DATA FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS (Jan. 1997) (1987-96).
23. Cf. United States v. Heeremac, Vof., No. 97 CR 0869 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 22, 1997), noted in 6
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097; United States v. Dockwise N.V., No. 97-CR-870 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec.
22, 1997), noted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097. In the foregoing cases, three companies agreed
to plead guilty to an international conspiracy in marine construction and transportation services and
pay a $65 million criminal fine, the second largest criminal antitrust fine ever, and three individuals
agreed to plead guilty and pay fines totaling $325,000. See also United States v. Roquette Freres, No.
CR 97-00356 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 17, 1997), noted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097 (French corporation and individual pled guilty to participating in an international industrial cleaner conspiracy and
agreed to pay criminal fines of $2.5 million and $50,000, respectively).
24. For inflation-adjusted data from 1955-94, see Gallo et al., supra note 22. Recent nominal individual fines are as follows:
Fiscal Year

Total Fines (in thousands)

Number

Average (in thousands)

1987

1,636

42

38.95

1988

1,996

53

37.66

1989

2,892

54

53.56

1990

917

30

30.57

1991

2,806

37

75.84

1992

1,275

27

47.22

1993

1,868

45

41.51

1994

1,240

33

37.58

1995

1,211

25

48.44

1996

1,572

16

98.25

1997

1,247

17

73.35

Source: ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD DATA FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS (Jan. 1997) (1987-96).
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25

six months in only four of the years before 1989. Starting in 1989, consistently
longer sentences have been imposed (although to fewer individuals, presumably as a result of what the Division describes as a policy of pursuing “fewer, but
26
more significant prosecutions”).
Although the FTC has no criminal authority with which to contrast its general lack of civil antitrust sanctions, its consumer fraud program seeks and obtains sanctions almost as draconian as criminal penalties against parties who
have engaged in near-criminal (if not criminal) wrongdoing. This program,
27
which came to dominate FTC consumer protection efforts during the 1980s,
continues to be a mainstay of FTC enforcement activity. In recent years, the
FTC has allied itself with the state attorneys general and other federal enforcers in coordinated attacks that impose serious consequences on perpetrators of
28
consumer fraud.
As part of its fraud program, the FTC regularly seeks and obtains from federal courts orders banning individuals from specific fields of endeavor (typically
25. See Gallo et al., supra note 22.
26. Id. Recent data from the Antitrust Division is as follows:

Fiscal Year

Jail Days Imposed

Individuals Sentenced

Average Sentence

1987

1,994

15

133

1988

5,892

30

196

1989

7,473

32

234

1990

2,739

17

161

1991

6,594

22

300

1992

2,488

11

226

1993

4,726

14

338

1994

1,497

9

166

1995

3,902

16

244

1996

2,431

5

486

1997
789
3
263
Source: ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD DATA FOR PAST 10 YEARS (JAN. 1997) (1987-96); 1997
data was obtained from the Antitrust Division.
27. The origins and development of the FTC’s consumer fraud program are set forth, and the program is evaluated in Miles W. Kirkpatrick et al., Report of the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 43 (1989) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick II].
28. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Fighting Consumer Fraud: The Challenge and the Campaign (Jan.
1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/Fraud/index.htm>; Federal Trade Comm’n, Fighting
Consumer Fraud: New Tools of the Trade (Apr. 1998), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/fraud97/
index/html>.
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telemarketing) or requiring that they post a bond before engaging in such an
29
activity. Given the records of many of these individuals, a requirement to post
a bond is often functionally equivalent to banning them from the activity altogether. While not prison, a lifetime sentence to refrain from one’s chosen way
of making a living is a remarkably severe (if perhaps well-deserved) conse30
quence.
The FTC has also won orders requiring defendants to pay quite massive
sums to specified persons and the U.S. treasury. For instance, in November of
1997, the FTC announced a $2.74 million “consumer redress” settlement for the
31
benefit of 38,000 consumers injured in an internet scam. Although not styled
32
as “fines” or “penalties,” these “consumer redress” payments extract cash,
33
sometimes for the benefit of the Treasury, just as effectively as any penalty.
29. See, e.g., FTC v. Career Assistance Planning, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 71,948 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 19, 1997) ($6 million performance bond); FTC v. Micom Corp., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
¶ 71,753 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1997) ($500,000 performance bond).
30. Although it is desirable as a matter of policy for the FTC to be able to impose the substantial
penalties discussed in the text, this program is in considerable tension with the original conception of
the FTC. The FTC was originally conceived as an expert body that could examine particular practices
and terminate those that were unfair or deceptive. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1994) (“If . . . the commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by this subchapter, it . . . shall issue . . . an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation
to cease and desist from using such method of competition or such act or practice.”). Consistent with
this conception and statutory authority, cases have declared that “[t]he purpose of the Federal Trade
Commission Act is to protect the public, not to punish a wrongdoer. . . .” Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322
F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963); see also FTC v Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) (“Orders of the
Federal Trade Commission are not intended to impose criminal punishment or exact compensatory
damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future.”); cf. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S.
683, 706 (1948) (“[T]he effect of the Commission’s order is not to punish or to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for the future.”).
31. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Victims of Moldovan Modem “Hijacking” Scheme to Get Full
Redress Under FTC Settlements, (Nov. 4, 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/9711/audiot2.htm>.
32. The FTC has only gradually assumed its role as a major collector of consumer redress. In
1971, the FTC issued an opinion that reversed the hearing examiner’s initial decision and concluded
that the agency could order restitution either to restore “the competitive status quo” or because the
respondent’s holding of ill-gotten gains “was an unfair trade practice in and of itself.” Curtis Publ’g
Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1516 (1971) (dismissing complaint on other grounds). The FTC observed that,
with respect to the statutory authorization to issue “cease and desist” orders, “[i]t has been generally
recognized that the remedial powers thus conferred are far broader and more flexible than a literal
reading of the statutory language would indicate.” Id. at 1512 (footnote omitted). When an unfortunate Ninth Circuit opinion held that the FTC’s section 5 authority did not extend to ordering refunds
of wrongly obtained moneys, Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974), the FTC elected not to seek
certiorari, but rather to rely on new authority granted it by Congress in section 19 of the FTC Act.
Section 19 authorizes the FTC to seek and courts to grant “such relief as the court finds necessary
to redress injury” from violations of trade regulation rules. Id. Also, when an FTC adjudicative proceeding has determined that a respondent committed an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” the FTC
may win such relief in court if it “satisfies the court” that “a reasonable man would have known under
the circumstances” that the act or practice “was dishonest or fraudulent.” Id. The FTC has used this
authority to win consumer redress in a couple of litigated proceedings and many administrative consent orders. See, e.g., FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasonable person would
have known it was “dishonest or fraudulent” to mislead consumers into believing that heat detectors
were superior to smoke detectors, so consumer redress—but not other disgorgement—was justified
under section 19 of the FTC Act).
Although, absent consent, section 19 authority can be used only in federal court after a full administrative trial, the FTC cautiously developed an alternative basis for obtaining court-ordered consumer
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More dramatic still, the FTC seeks many of these remedies through ex parte
proceedings in which judicial asset freezes are successfully sought.34 The fear

redress and other relief without an administrative trial. FTC Act section 13(b), which was added in
1973, is a general authorization for the FTC to seek a preliminary injunction against any continuing or
expected violation of any law it enforced. 15 U.S.C. § 53. Section 13(b) also provides that “in proper
cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.”
Id. On this seemingly slender reed, the FTC established its massive program for winning substantial
relief against fraud artists. See Robert D. Paul, The FTC’s Increased Reliance on Section 13(b) in Court
Litigation, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 141 (1988).
Ironically, the breadth of section 13(b) was first recognized by an appellate court over the FTC’s
protests. In FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981), a divided court rejected the
FTC’s argument that a court was authorized to grant only a full-stop preliminary injunction, and not a
hold-separate order. Judge Douglas Ginsburg explained for the Court that, rather than carefully delineating a remedy, section 13(b) “[p]rincipally. . .posts a clear entrance sign for FTC provisional relief
applications.” Id. at 1084. Congress intended that courts would mold decrees with the flexibility traditional in equity. Id. This teaching, from an FTC defeat, was promptly used in an FTC success, FTC v.
Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1982), which reversed a district court’s decision to limit
the FTC to relief it could have ordered in an administrative proceeding:
Although the plain language of the statute speaks only of enjoining an allegedly unlawful act
of [sic] practice, virtually identical statutes permitting other agencies to seek preliminary injunctions have been interpreted as invoking the full equitable jurisdiction of the district court.
These cases make indisputably clear that a grant of jurisdiction such as that contained in Section 13(b) carries with it the authorization for the district court to exercise the full range of
equitable remedies traditionally available to it.
Id. at 717-18 (citations omitted).
A month later, the Ninth Circuit set forth a similar view and explicitly held that section 13(b)
authorized courts to freeze assets. See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982)
(“We hold that Congress, when it gave the district court authority to grant a permanent injunction
against violations of any provisions of law enforced by the FTC, also gave the district court authority to
grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice because it did not limit that traditional equitable power explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference.”).
Since the early 1980s, the district courts and the courts of appeal have consistently interpreted section 13(b) to permit courts to rely on their traditional equitable powers to “order any ancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the exercise of the granted powers.” FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc.,
875 F.2d 564, 572 (7th Cir. 1989); see also FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
Those inherent equitable powers have been the basis for the awarding of consumer redress, restitution,
recission, and other relief. See id. at 531 (affirming award of $16 million in consumer redress); FTC v.
Gem Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996) (ordering $487,500 in disgorgement to consumers or, if not feasible, to the U.S. Treasury; FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d
1312 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming the monetary equivalent of recission). Courts have ruled that even
substantial consumer redress and disgorgement (courts do not always distinguish carefully between the
two) are not punitive. See, e.g., FTC v Febre, 128 F.3d at 537 (“This court has held that disgorgement
is designed to be remedial and not punitive. . . . As an equitable remedy, disgorgement is meant to
place the deceived consumer in the same position he would have occupied had the seller not induced
him to enter into the transaction. Disgorgement also prevents the defendant from being unjustly enriched by his fraud.” ) (citations omitted); Gem Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d at 470 (holding that disgorgement is appropriate “‘to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to deter others’”)
(quoting SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
33. The FTC’s anti-fraud campaign was assisted by Congress when it passed the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. §§ 5711-24 (1994); see also 16 C.F.R. § 310
(1997) (implementing regulations). This statute and the rules implementing it make various fraudulent
telemarketing practices punishable through substantial civil penalties in suits brought by the FTC or
state attorneys general.
34. See, e.g., Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d at 575-76 (affirming district court’s freeze of all assets except amount court thought reasonable for attorneys’ fees and expenses); FTC v. H.N. Singer,
Inc., 668 F.2d at 1107 (finding that lower court had power to freeze assets); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas
Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (agreeing with lower court’s conclusion that it
“has the inherent power of a court of equity to grant ancillary relief, including freezing assets and ap-
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that justifies such relief is that otherwise the malfeasors will squirrel assets
away, safe from the arm of the law. The coincident by-product of such orders,
however, is that the defendants may have little stomach for defending a lawsuit
(or, if they have stomach, few assets).35 Time and again, the FTC wins relief
against little opposition.
TABLE 1
REDRESS ORDERED IN FTC CASES

Fiscal Year

Number of Cases

Amount Ordered ($000)

1990

37

51,459

1991

37

83,521 to 125,471

1992

49

73,029

1993

27

15,913

1994

48

60,274

1995

62

63,973

1996

48

80,993

1997

92

121,300

TOTAL

400

550,462 to 592,412

Source: Table modified from Calkins, supra note 3, with addition of more recent data supplied by the FTC.

B. Contrast with Remedies for Other Violations
The likelihood of imposing potentially very serious penalties for “hard-core
36
antitrust violations” and consumer fraud makes the absence of any federal
pointing a Receiver, as an incident to its express statutory authority to issue a permanent injunction
under section 13 of the Federal Trade Commission Act”).
35. Cf., e.g., FTC v. Silvers, No. 96-3977 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1997) (stipulated judgment) (three of
the four named defendants signed individually); FTC v. Deco Consulting Serv. Inc., No. 96-7196 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 19, 1997) (one of three named defendants signed individually); FTC v. S.J.A. Soc’y, Inc., No.
2:97cv472 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1997) (one of three defendants signed individually).
36. Anne K. Bingaman & Gary R. Spratling, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, Joint Address before the Criminal Antitrust Law and Procedure Workshop, ABA Section of Antitrust Law (Feb. 23,
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sanction for most other violations of the Sherman Act and the FTC Act striking. The most egregious example of anti-competitive predation, the most aggressively offensive group boycott, the most transparently illegal merger—
assuming they did not cross the line to criminality—would each likely result in,
37
at most, a prospective, nonpunitive order. This is less a problem with mergers,
because most major mergers are reported to the antitrust agencies under the
38
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which Congress passed in order to give the agencies
an opportunity to enjoin problematic mergers. Where a merger is not reported,
either through non-compliance or because the merger is not subject to a reporting requirement, the agencies are left after the fact to try to prevent con39
tinuing harm, with time working in the prospective defendant’s favor. Federal
antitrust enforcement is largely an all-or-nothing world of extreme penalties or
no punishment at all.
If nothing else, it seems odd for two agencies to have such a bi-modal approach to punishing. Were one coming at the issue afresh, one would expect to
see a graduated series of sanctions.
As it stands now, the system’s extreme divergence in consequences has
costs. For instance, the agencies may stretch to fit questioned activity within
the category of activities for which there are serious sanctions in order that a
punishment will be imposed. Where there are very serious sanctions, however,
40
courts are (quite properly) hesitant to find violations. (Indeed, some might
take comfort in courts’ reluctance to find violations except where wrongdoing is

1995), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/95-02-23.txt>. See generally ANTITRUST
SECTION, supra note 20, at 662-65 (citations omitted):
[T]he Division has a long-standing policy of seeking indictments only where it believes it
can prove a clear, purposeful violation of the law. The vast majority of cases prosecuted
criminally under the Sherman Act have involved allegations of per se violations of section 1,
including horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, and market or consumer allocation.
[C]riminal indictments are unlikely where: the state of the law is unclear, there are novel
issues of law or fact, there is confusion caused by prior prosecutorial action, or there is clear
evidence the defendants did not appreciate the consequences of their actions.
The distinction between criminal and antitrust standards was carefully drawn by Assistant Attorney
General Baker. See Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman
Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978). In a current example of Division line-drawing, Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein explained that the Division did not proceed criminally against a
horizontal arrangement affecting price in NASDAQ because the arrangement was “really an industry
practice” that was followed only “as a matter of custom,” which made the agreement “thin.” Joel I.
Klein, Criminal Enforcement in a Globalized Economy, Address at the Advanced Criminal Antitrust
Workshop (Feb. 20, 1997), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/jik97220.htm>.
37. For the rare exceptions, see infra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
39. Cf. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (1982
transaction upheld based significantly on post-transaction developments); In re Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 1996 FTC LEXIS 387 (Sept. 9, 1996) (dismissing 1988 complaint challenging a 1984 acquisition
because, “in light of the age of the challenged transaction, the limited size of the market, and the age
of the record evidence regarding the competitive impact of the challenged acquisition, further expenditure of resources on this case would not be in the public interest”). But cf. Automatic Data Processing,
Inc., No. 9282 (FTC Oct. 20, 1997) (consent order), noted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,285
(divestiture ordered to resolve post-acquisition challenge to 1995 transaction).
40. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986).
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sufficiently clear to justify serious penalty.) If an enforcement agency, without
the alternative of a modest penalty, has tried to justify a high penalty, cases
may be lost that perhaps should have been won.
For instance, one wonders whether the Antitrust Division would have
brought that troubled case against General Electric if it could have pursued
41
some punishment short of criminal conviction. Similarly, in 1990 the Antitrust
Division fired a shot across the bow of all professionals considering fixing
42
prices when it indicted a group of Tuscon, Arizona, dentists. That shot rebounded back against the Division when the trial judge acquitted two dentists
43
and granted the third a new trial. Although the Ninth Circuit vacated the acquittals, the Court expressed grave discomfort at the prospect of punishing den44
tists’ practice-related conduct with criminal convictions, and the Division set45
tled the cases. Assistant Attorney General Klein has noted that, if nothing
46
else, the Ninth Circuit doubted the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The
Division many not have felt compelled to take such a dramatic step if a lesser
but still punitive option were available.
Pushing questionable cases into the high-sanctions category surely results in
some firms being penalized more severely than they ought to be. One hopes
that enforcement agencies will never bring unfounded suits, but error is human,
so the best of agencies surely make mistakes. Although many prosecutorial errors are corrected in litigation, many cases are not litigated, but rather are set-

41. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Ohio 1994). In General Electric, the Division sought to prove a criminal price-fixing conspiracy despite the absence (for lack of jurisdiction) of three of the four named defendants and many potential witnesses. In the end, the Court
viewed the case as an “information exchange case” that should be subject to the rule of reason, rather
than a per se price-fixing conspiracy where criminal culpability had been shown. Id. at 1301; see also
William W. Horne, GE Crushes the Trustbusters, AMERICAN LAWYER, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 57.
42. See United States v. Alston, No. CR90-042-TUC (D. Ariz. 1990). The indictments are discussed in Phillip A. Proger, Application of the Sherman Act to Health Care: New Developments and
New Directions, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 189-90 (1990). Proger quotes Assistant Attorney General
Rill’s “strong, but necessary words:” “‘[W]hen professionals fix prices, they will be pursued and prosecuted for the crime.’” Id. at 189. Proger cautioned that “[w]e still do not know how juries will react to
allegations against professionals and their predictable defenses based on quality and patient welfare.”
Id.
43. See United States v. Alston, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,366 (D. Ariz. 1990), vacated in
part, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992). The litigation’s “checkered history” up to the appeal is chronicled
in Neil P. Montenko, Health Care Developments, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 639, 639-41 (1992).
44. See United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d at 1214:
Finally, we are told that this is the first criminal antitrust prosecution of health care professionals in half a century. See Brief for the ADA and the AMA as Amici Curiae at 4. While it
is not our place to question the government’s motives in elevating to the criminal level a dispute normally handled as a civil enforcement matter, the crushing consequences of a criminal
conviction on the lives and careers of the defendants singled out for such treatment makes it
all the more important that the district judge spell out with specificity what the jury must find
in order to convict.
45. See United States v. Alston, No. CR-90-042-TUC (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 1993). Charges against the
three dentists and one professional corporation were dismissed with prejudice. One sole-shareholder
professional corporation entered a no contest plea and agreed to pay $5,000 and perform 250 hours of
community service.
46. See Klein, supra note 36.
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tled (or not contested), resulting in cases in which overly severe remedies are
47
imposed.
Finally, but most obviously, the limitation of penalties to very selected cases
may result in insufficient deterrence. To be sure, the antitrust agency agenda is
not limited to deterrence; in particular, modern merger review is a largely
regulatory process designed to isolate and excise offending aspects of otherwise
benign or pro-competitive mergers. At times, however, the antitrust agencies
enforce rules that are reasonably clear and intended to prevent harmful conduct, yet relatively ineffectual because enforcement is unaccompanied by penalties. The likelihood of suboptimal deterrence is discussed below.
IV
REFLECTIONS ON CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ISSUES AND ANTITRUST
AGENCY PENALIZING PRACTICES
Some leading current corporate-compliance issues were reviewed above in
Part II. Having now considered the structure of deterrence at the Antitrust Division and the FTC, I reflect on these issues—individual liability, entity liability, criminal liability, and carrots—in light of the experience of the antitrust
agencies.
A. Individual Liability
Government antitrust officials hold individuals responsible for criminal
wrongdoing, but for little else. With a few exceptions, in each of the past seventeen fiscal years, the Division has won indictments against almost as many
48
individuals as corporations:

47. The lack of intermediate sanctions may impose costs even for cases brought under civil
authority. One worries about whether the all-too-human temptation to seek to punish someone who
has done wrong does not manifest itself in order provisions that may be designed, if only subconsciously, to impose costs. Thus, for many years the FTC had a policy of insisting on an order if a firm
litigated a merger–even if the firm abandoned the merger before the appeals process was exhausted.
This led to the discomforting spectacle of the FTC expending massive resources to adjudicate a challenge to a long-abandoned merger by Coca-Cola, all because Coca-Cola would not agree to an order.
One has to guess (and for me it is only a guess) that each side thought the other utterly unreasonable:
Coke because the FTC sought an order of little practical significance, the FTC because Coke wouldn’t
agree to that same order. In 1995, the FTC abandoned its policy of routinely requiring prior approval
clauses in orders resolving litigated but abandoned mergers. See Statement of FTC Policy Concerning
Prior Approval and Prior Notice Provisions, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,241 (June 21, 1995). The
FTC resolved its dispute with Coca-Cola by consent. See 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,822 (May 18,
1995) (prior approval required before buying Dr. Pepper).
48. Antitrust Division’s Workload Data for Past 10 Years, 72 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 117 (Jan. 30, 1997); 60 Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 133 (Jan. 24, 1991). 1997 data
courtesy of Antitrust Division.
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TABLE 2
DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION INDICTMENTS

Fiscal Year

Individuals

Corporations

1981

83

74

Individuals as a
percentage of
Corporations
112%

1982

103

113

91%

1983

113

122

93%

1984

104

131

79%

1985

36

50

72%

1986

60

69

87%

1987

116

119

97%

1988

78

89

88%

1989

76

88

88%

1990

72

88

82%

1991

58

70

83%

1992

65

64

102%

1993

50

62

81%

1994

50

55

91%

1995

32

40

80%

1996

22

41

54%

1997

29

24

121%

Yet the Division very rarely names individuals as defendants in civil suits.
In calendar years 1995 through 1997, for instance, excluding actions alleging
failure to report mergers, the Division did not file a single civil action against
49
an individual.
The FTC brings only civil cases and, like the Division’s apparent civil-case
policy, names relatively few individuals in competition complaints. Of 115
merger final consent orders, from fiscal year 1990 through October 31, 1997,
50
only three named individuals. Of 102 non-merger final consent orders during
51
the same time period, only fifteen named individuals. Individuals were espe49. Source: Volume 6 of CCH ¶ 45,096 has 1996 Trade Regulation Summaries of DOJ complaints;
¶ 45,097 has 1997 data.
50. See Letter from Pat Foster, Management Information Specialist, FTC Bureau of Competition,
to Stephen Calkins, Professor of Law, Wayne State University (Nov. 4, 1997) (on file with author).
51. See id.
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cially likely to be named in health care matters where relief considerations
made it important that orders apply to individuals (who could otherwise engage
52
in the same conduct with a different entity).
Just as the Division’s civil practice stands in sharp contrast to its criminal
practice, the FTC’s competition practice contrasts sharply with its fraud prac53
tice. The FTC routinely names individuals in federal fraud suits. It regularly
54
wins strong relief against several individuals per proceeding.
55
The Division policy of pursuing individuals is sound; indeed, if anything,
56
the Division should pursue more individuals more regularly. If a corporation
has engaged in sufficiently hard-core price fixing or market division to justify
criminal condemnation, it would seem inevitable that one or more individuals
in those corporations had, as well. That individual liability is essential flows
logically from the same economics of deterrence that is at the source of much
of the current debate.
It is now accepted that one can vary the level of penalty with the likelihood
of being apprehended and punished. If an entity faces a ten percent chance of
being caught, it is important that its prospective punishment be dramatically
greater than the actual harm it imposes. This conclusion applies to entities and
to individuals within entities.
Unfortunately, none of a corporation’s usual array of employee punishments—denied promotions, demotions, discipline, and even termination—
comes anywhere near the proper level of punishment for serious, hard-core
52. See, e.g., Home Oxygen & Med. Equip. Co., 118 F.T.C. 661 (1994) (organization and 13 doctors); Certain Home Oxygen Pulmonologists, 118 F.T.C. 685 (1994) (four doctors); Homecare Oxygen
& Med. Equip. Co., 118 F.T.C. 706 (1994) (organization and 11 doctors); Trauma Assoc. of N.
Broward, Inc., 118 F.T.C. 1130 (1994) (organization and 10 doctors); Diran M. Seropian, 115 F.T.C.
891 (1992); Southbank IPA, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 783 (1991) (two organizations and 23 doctors); Medical
Staff of Dickinson County Mem’l Hosp., 112 F.T.C. 33 (1989) (consents from medical staff, two medical societies, 10 members of an executive committee, and another staff member); Rochester Anesthesiologists, 110 F.T.C. 175 (1988) (34 doctors). For a discussion of the legal standards governing the
naming of corporate officers, directors, and employees in FTC administrative orders, see STEPHANIE
W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 11.08 (1995).
53. According to its Annual Report, the FTC named individuals in 97% of the consumer cases it
brought in fiscal 1996, for a total of 76 individuals named in 35 cases. See <http://www.ftc.gov/os/ar96/
append7a.htm#Consumer Redress>; see also Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d at 573 (“Once corporate
liability is established, the FTC must show that the individual defendants participated directly in the
practices or acts or had authority to control them. . . . The FTC must then demonstrate that the individual had some knowledge of the practices.”); Gem Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d at 470 (following
FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc.); Career Assistance Planning, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at ¶ 71,948
(following Gem Merchandising); FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D. Minn. 1985)
(“In addition, the FTC must show that the defendants directly participated in the acts or had the
authority to control the conduct. Authority to control a company is evidenced by active involvement
with business matters and corporate policy including assumption of officer duties.”) (citations omitted).
54. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Fighting Consumer Fraud: The Challenge and the Campaign, supra
note 28.
55. See, e.g., Bingaman & Spratling, supra note 36 (“I want to underscore something that individuals should think about before they engage in price fixing or bid rigging. . . . People go to jail for these
offenses.”).
56. Cf. Roger D. Blair, A Suggestion for Improved Antitrust Enforcement, 30 ANTITRUST BULL.
433 (1985) (urging emphasis on liability of individuals, who may maximize their personal utility at the
expense of the firm).
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57

covert price fixing of a substantial part of commerce. Conceivably, in the extraordinary case, a corporation could fire an employee with such fanfare that
other firms would ostracize him or her (thus inflicting a substantial loss of lifetime earnings), but such cases seem unusual in an age when candid evaluations
are the exception and redemption continues to be in fashion.
Entities, in short, need the government to promise individual punishments
so severe that price-fixing is deterred. Without the threat of a substantial penalty, a corporation’s only alternative is to expend resources to increase the
likelihood of detection (which may or may not be efficient). This alternative,
which emphasizes monitoring, inspections, and the like, is costly to the corporation in real terms and seems likely to injure morale by sowing seeds of unneces58
sary distrust. It also seems doomed to fail. Under current law, a corporation
that discovers wrongdoing runs considerable risk in going public with that information, because it then could incur punishment through government or pri59
vate challenges. Employees may count on a corporation’s hesitancy, figuring
that severe punishment for price-fixing is quite unlikely since any such punish60
ment likely would prompt the employee to make public the price-fixing.
Without the threat of individual liability, a corporation could not raise an employee’s perceived chance of discovery sufficiently high to deter price-fixing,
given the limited penalties the corporation can impose. The threat of individual liability also is important because employees are quite mobile today. A
corporation can do little to a former employee.
The Division’s preference for incarceration, as opposed to individual fines,
also seems sensible. It seems highly unlikely that individual fines alone would
57. Firms also may face institutional constraints on their ability to choose an option that trades
little monitoring for draconian penalties. It has been observed that firms expend surprising resources
to detect employee theft and shirking, perhaps because an alternative use of very large penalties might
adversely affect employee attitudes and performance, and a firm’s public image. See William T. Dickens et al., Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle, 7 J. LABOR ECON. 331, 341 (1989). The threat
of a very large externally imposed penalty poses some, but not all, of these problems, because the decision to punish is external to the firm.
58. It has been suggested that employees would insist on compensation to reflect the expected
value of any penalties they would incur. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 464 (5th ed. 1998). Even if true, this point does not detract from the point made in the text. At
least where liability rules are clear, employees can attach an extremely low probability to the chance of
paying any penalty at all, simply by intending to obey the law.
To offer an illustrative anecdote, a friend of mine who is the chief executive officer of a $400 million company tells me that training, supervision, monitoring, and review were nowhere near as effective in deterring speeding and illegal parking by company drivers as the simple institution of a policy
that the individuals pay the fines. “[T]he role of private antitrust practitioners in counseling clients is
made substantially easier if business executives recognize that the Antitrust Division has the will and
capacity to identify and convict most price fixers.” Report of the ABA Antitrust Law Section Task
Force on the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 737, 764 (1989).
59. It was in recognition of this concern that the Antitrust Division expanded its Corporate Leniency Policy into a guaranteed amnesty program if certain criteria were met. See Gary R. Spratling,
The Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions, Address at the ABA Antitrust Section 1998 Spring Meeting (Apr. 1, 1998), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/1626.htm>;
Anne K. Bingaman, Change and Continuity in Antitrust Enforcement, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 8-9 (Oct. 21, 1993), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/93-10-21.txt>
(describing new policy).
60. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 712-17.

CALKINS.FMT

Page 127: Summer 1997]

09/30/98 3:30 PM

C ORPORATE COMPLIANCE

143

rise to the level needed to deter price-fixing without additional deterrence, such
as incarceration. This assumption stems from two reasons. Fines are unlikely
to rise, and high fines would not work anyway. Professor Joseph C. Gallo and
his colleagues found that never in antitrust history have individual fines aver61
aged even $100,000 annually in 1982 dollars. Even in nominal terms, fines
since 1990 (when the maximum was raised) have ranged from a low of $37,580
62
in fiscal year 1994 to a high of $98,250 in fiscal year 1996. Nor does it seem
likely that were incarceration eliminated these numbers would go substantially
higher, or at least not higher by the necessary order of magnitude. And, in any
event, were the numbers raised sufficiently high, the great majority of individ63
ual defendants would be unable to pay. Accordingly, individual criminal li64
ability for hard-core price fixing seems warranted. Indeed, it would seem desirable to make greater use of it by increasing the number of individual
compared with corporate indictments. Now company officials may be unduly
eager to sacrifice shareholder interests by settling civil cases without imposing
individual liability in order to prevent friends and colleagues from paying a per65
sonal price. It is important to shareholders in general that individual wrongdoers pay a substantial personal price, and this means that the Division must
resist attempts by corporations to resolve cases without imposing such personal
prices.
The FTC’s frequent charging of individuals with fraud also represents sound
general policy. Often, the corporations engaged in this activity are little more
than vehicles for individuals to perpetrate schemes, and it makes sense to
charge the real party. Where the individual who bears or shares principal responsibility for causing such serious harm can be identified, there is no reason
66
not to proceed against him or her.
Given the comparative frequency with which the Division proceeds criminally against individuals believed to have engaged in naked cartel activities, and
how commonly the FTC charges individuals with civil fraud, it is striking how

61. See Gallo et al., supra note 22. Relatively small individual fines are consistent with the Division’s policy to prefer incarceration, so it is impossible to be sure what fines would result from a
change in policy. 1982 dollars were used merely as a control year.
62. Calculated from ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD DATA FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS (Jan.
1997).
63. For the suggestion that inability to pay damages awards can partly explain the surprising (to
some) lack of private litigation following-on government litigation, see Gregory L. Werden, PriceFixing and Civil Damages: Setting the Record Straight, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 307, 328-29 (1989). Any
suggestion that prison should be reserved for those who lack sufficient assets is a political non-starter
that does not deserve serious discussion except as an interesting academic exercise.
64. See Blair, supra note 56, at 440-41 (also noting that imprisonment has the advantage of being
incapable of being shifted to the firm).
65. Cf. Coffee, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick,” supra note 12, at 448 n.165 (describing what
were then known as “Westinghouse settlements” in which the corporation pleads guilty but charges
are dropped against individuals).
66. The black letter law permits the FTC great discretion as to whom it should charge for a corporation’s wrongs. My personal view is that the FTC should refrain from charging individuals with derivative liability unless it reasonably expects to be able to show responsibility in fact for the wrongs
and the harms caused.
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rarely the Division and the FTC’s Bureau of Competition include charges
against individuals in civil suits brought against entities.
B. Entity Liability
67

Largely for reasons canvassed in the literature, the antitrust agencies appear on sensible ground in imposing responsibility for violations on entities.
Such responsibility is the only alternative in that large part of the agencies’
program where they do not charge individuals. The FTC’s hard-core fraud
program attacks entities organized to violate the law, so it would be odd to
challenge selected individuals and not the entity itself.
Even for price-fixing, however, where individuals are indicted and sent to
prison, it makes sense to proceed against the entity as well. As noted above,
the Division currently indicts fewer than one person per indicted corporation.
It seems unlikely that price-fixing is the responsibility entirely of solo rogue
employees. Other individuals likely participated or assisted (if only by inattention), and entity liability is necessary if there is to be any hope of indirectly
punishing them. The government proceeds only against individuals with great
responsibility, where the evidence is clear-cut. Lesser wrongdoers also need
punishment, and the government can and should work indirectly to cause them
to be punished.
More generally, companies have the ability to try to influence if not entirely
control the amount of price-fixing in which their employees engage, and it is
important to provide a corporate incentive for firms to do so. Corporations can
design compliance programs and consciously send the subtle, important signals
that they take compliance seriously (even making compliance matters part of
annual reviews and something factored into compensation decisions). The
above discussion of individual criminal liability emphasized that the prospect of
individual jail time is an essential component of a corporate compliance program. It is only part, however; corporate responsibility for price-fixing helps
make sure that the message gets out.
The case for individual criminal liability flows easily from the above discussion, since incarceration is by definition criminal. Corporate criminal liability
does not lead to incarceration, but merely to paying fines and perhaps corporate probation. Since the same dollars could be paid by the same company to
the same U.S. Treasury, commentators have legitimately asked whether it
makes any sense (and any difference) to collect the money criminally rather
than civilly. They have pointed out that criminal enforcement can be more expensive and difficult and (by hypothesis) yields no greater payment. Other
commentators have worried about the entire concept of criminal corporate liability, and have asked how a corporation really can have the mens rea that we
68
require for criminal liability.
67. See generally Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 4.
68. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 329 (1993) (arguing that corporate intent should be an essential element of criminal
liability); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of
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One simple response to these arguments, for purposes of the antitrust laws,
is that Congress has provided for criminal corporate liability and not for civil
69
liability. The Antitrust Division can punish corporations criminally. Given
the Division’s apparently well-founded belief that international cartels are of
70
increasing concern, it is hard to fault their view that they should use the tools
Congress had provided to them.
Another response is to doubt that, as some have suggested, a civil fine has
71
the same deterrent effect as a criminal fine. The stock-market studies of this
72
issue are inconclusive. My discussions with officers and lawyers for a series of
substantial companies, however, are decidedly one-sided: Criminal is differ73
ent. As one CEO told me, if his company pays a moderate civil fine, it is five
minutes at a regular board of director’s meeting; were that same fine a felony,
there is a special board meeting. One CEO worried about customers that
would rather not purchase from a tainted source; an inside counsel worried
about recruiting new employees; another inside counsel worried about the ef74
fect on existing employees. The persons with whom I talked disagreed so
strongly with the suggestion that criminal and civil fines are equivalent that I
75
am loath to assume that they are, absent some clear supporting evidence.
Corporate Mens Rea (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that corporate mens rea standards are generally undesirable); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 729
(1994) (arguing that criminal liability should depend on the corporate “mental state”); Parker, supra
note 7, at 384-85.
69. Note that the FTC has considered expanding its seeking of consumer redress in competition
cases. See infra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Joel I. Klein, Anticipating The Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement at
the End of the Twentieth Century, Address Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 16,
1997), available at <http:/www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches>; Klein, supra note 36 (“international cartels will
be an ever-increasing problem”); Gary R. Spratling, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Against International Cartels, Address Before the Advanced Criminal Antitrust Workshop (Feb. 21, 1997), available
at <http:/www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches> (noting that international cartels may be the Division’s highest
priority).
71. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 7, at 387-88 (arguing that punitive civil sanctions make corporate
criminal liability unnecessary).
72. Compare, for example, Block, supra note 7, with Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, The
Reputational Penalty Firms Bear, 36 J. L. & ECON. 757 (1993).
73. See Khanna, supra note 7, at 1509 (providing anecdotal evidence that criminal proceedings
have greater reputational effects). Cf. James Lyons, Tough Guys, FORBES, Apr. 15, 1991, at 94 (“A
Word of Warning to anyone even thinking about price-fixing or bid-rigging these days: The Justice
Department’s version of Dirty Harry may be on your case.”); Ian P. Murphy, P-O-P Marketers Warned
About Antitrust Violations, MARKETING NEWS, May 26, 1997, at 14 (“‘They are criminal violations
that cheat the consumer . . . .’” (quoting Antitrust Division attorney)).
The Division’s press release announcing Archer-Daniels-Midland’s $100 million fine used the word
“criminal” three times in its first two sentences. See Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. to Plead Guilty and
Pay $100 Million for Role in Two International Price-Fixing Conspiracies (modified Oct. 15, 1996)
available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/press_releases/1996press/508at.htm>.
74. This last counsel also speculated that the Wall Street Journal would cover a criminal conviction or plea more prominently than a civil fine. I share that speculation. This may be a testable hypothesis (and may have been tested, although it is very hard to isolate out the criminal label from the
rest of the package).
75. Cf. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERS ch. 16 (1983) (chronicling how General Electric was harmed by publicity associated with
notorious electrical equipment conspiracies); Melissa S. Baucus & David A. Baucus, Paying the Piper:
An Empirical Examination of Longer-Term Financial Consequences of Illegal Corporate Behavior, 40
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If criminal fines are, by definition, more punitive than equal civil fines, then
that would be reason enough for the Division to oppose conversion of historically criminal antitrust fines to civil fines. Gallo and his colleagues have carefully compared actual and optimal antitrust fines, and concluded that actual
fines fall woefully short of the ideal. More specifically, Gallo computed that
fines imposed between 1955 and 1993 represented barely more than four-tenths
76
of one percent of optimal fines. Subsequent research has found that firms
were easily capable of paying dramatically larger fines, such that the actual
fines paid and even the maximum fines permitted by the statute may not deter
77
price-fixing behavior. Even substantially increasing maximum criminal corporate fines, as the Division has requested, will not raise them to a level where the
Division is likely to conclude that equal civil fines would provide sufficient deterrence.
Apart from pure deterrence, the Division likely remains loyal to criminal
fines because it views the Sherman Act’s long-time status as a criminal statute
as an important expression of societal norms. Law Professor John C. Coffee
78
has reminded us that criminal laws communicate beliefs and values. Plus, the
Antitrust Division has a long history of emphasizing that price fixing is a crime.
Even if it were more sensible to have proceeded with civil corporate sanctions
at one time, it would send a troubling message to de-criminalize price-fixing
now. Conceivably one could retain criminal individual liability while moving to
civil corporate liability, but politicians are not likely to want to appear to be favoring companies over individuals. Thus, there seems little chance that corporate price fixing will be de-criminalized, and—at least at currently contemplated levels of fines—keeping the status quo seems sound.
B. Carrots
The current structure of penalties offers two different and important
“carrots” for corporate compliance. First, the Division has a widely touted am79
nesty program for the first person to report a conspiracy. Second, the SenACAD. MGMT. J. 129, 146 (1997) (although short-term consequences are indeterminate, a sample of
firms found liable for serious wrongdoing showed consistently poorer long-term performance than a
control group; the authors speculated that such a finding “may stain a firm’s image, sending a warning
signal to stakeholders, or prompt stakeholders to reassess relationships with the firm”).
76. See Joseph C. Gallo et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study in Law and
Economics, 16 RES. L. & ECON. 25, 59 (1994). Even adjusting for jail time served, penalties were limited to four one-hundredths of one percent of optimal fines. See id. at 58.
77. See Catherine Craycraft et al., Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm’s Ability to Pay, 12 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 171 (1997) (100% of firms in sample, 1955-93, could pay actual and maximum fine from cash on
hand plus short term securities; 42% of firms could pay the optimal fine (an average of over $1.9 billion) without being technically bankrupt).
78. See generally Coffee, Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?, supra note 7; Coffee, “No Soul to
Damn: No Body to Kick,” supra note 12, at 447. For a thoughtful economic argument that criminal law
works by shaping preferences as well as opportunities, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic
Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1.
79. See Anne K. Bingman, Remarks Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agency, (Mar. 24, 1995); Gary R.
Spratling, The Experience and Views of the Antitrust Division, Address at Corporate Crime in America: Strengthening the “Good Citizen” Corporation (Sept. 8, 1995); Gary R. Spratling, The Trend To-
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tencing Guidelines offer lessened penalties when corporations have “effective”
80
compliance programs.
The Division has been quite emphatic about its opposition to considering
81
corporate compliance activities as part of the determination of liability, and
rightly so. Indeed, the case for substantially reducing corporate penalties for an
“effective” compliance program that happened to have failed seems less than
82
overwhelming.
In a market economy, society usually provides incentives and then relies on
market participants to seek out the most efficient response. A generation of
economists have shown that incentives are superior to commands and con83
trols, yet somehow this learning has been ignored. The results are all too predictable.
A company has a wide array of ways to increase its compliance with various
laws. It can emphasize the quality of its people, by hiring honest employees,
encouraging them to live healthy lives, and taking care of them in time of need.
It can create good incentives, by tying compensation to long-term results, by refraining from exerting undue pressure, and by paying supra-competitive wages
employees will not want to risk losing. It can teach and remind. It can monitor
and audit. And it can threaten with whatever draconian consequences are in its
power (including, perhaps, turning employees over to government law enforcers). Some companies will be better at one approach, some at another, most at
some mix; but it would be surprising were the same approach right for all.
Accordingly, it would seem self-evident that government should set out
penalties for violating the law and leave it to firms to determine how best to re84
spond to those penalties. That is not the approach of the Sentencing Guidewards Higher Corporate Fines: It’s a Whole New Ball Game, Address at the Eleventh Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (March 7, 1995).
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., James F. Rill, The Importance of Deterring Antitrust Crime: Corporate Compliance
Programs and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks at the Symposium on Antitrust and Association Law of the D.C. Bar Ass’n 1 (Feb. 20, 1992), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches>
(“executives too often fail to understand that the true benefit of a compliance program in fact is to
prevent the commission of antitrust crimes, and not simply to avoid being prosecuted for them”);
Spratling, The Experience and Views of the Antitrust Division, supra note 79.
82. The Division was criticized in connection with the ADM settlement for not insisting on a
court-supervised compliance program. This failure allegedly meant that the “Division gave up the opportunity to make a significant statement about the need for antitrust compliance programs.” Gregory
J. Wallance, The Terms of Archer-Daniels-Midland’s $100 Million Plea Agreement Suggest that Justice
May Be Emphasizing Fines, Not Future Compliance, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at B4. In reality, of
course, there may be no more effective statement about the importance of genuinely effective antitrust
compliance than the ADM proceeding. Nonetheless, compliance programs are becoming a regular
part of probation. See, e.g., Michael J. Woods, Environmental Compliance Programs as a Condition of
Organizational Probation, 8 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 209 (1996). This trend is lamented in Mark A.
Cohen, Environmental Sentencing Guidelines or Environmental Management Guidelines: You Can’t
Have Your Cake and Eat it Too!, 8 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 225 (1996).
83. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
84. It is striking, in this regard, how widespread corporate compliance programs had become before the Sentencing Guidelines supplied additional incentive and the Delaware courts added their encouragement, and without the additional reward of special immunities. See, e.g., Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 9, at 1654 n.257 (noting that surveys show that 75% to 95% of U.S. firms have
written codes of conduct or ethics).
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lines, which have emphasized government-designed compliance programs. Inevitably, the quixotic effort to define the good yet unsuccessful compliance
85
program has stumbled. Some want further to define good programs. Others
worry that potential liability may prevent the auditing and monitoring that is
part of a good program, thus they urge the creation of immunities to encourage
a good program. My own inclination is to resist the campaign to reward unsuccessful programs that meet externally-created standards.
Mine is only an inclination, however, and not a firm conclusion. Two arguments favoring a “carrot” approach give me pause. The first is the suggestion
that corporate mens rea should not be considered proven, for criminal liability,
if the corporation as an institution has taken sufficiently strong (albeit unsuc86
cessful) steps to attempt to comply with the law. This is a troubling proposition. It is a creature solely of criminalization of corporate liability. Corporate
criminality might be justified on operationalist grounds (it’s effective) or as
sending a signal about society’s values, but much of corporate criminal liability
is about liability based exclusively on a wrongful act, without regard to what individuals subjectively intended. Rewarding good faith but unsuccessful efforts
to comply with the law in part appeals to those with underlying concern about
87
corporate criminality, but it undermines some of the bright-line benefits of
making certain actions criminal for a corporation.
The other argument that gives pause is the sophisticated attempt by Arlen
and Kraakman to show that only a composite approach, with a mix of strict liability penalties and conduct-oriented incentives, can achieve the optimal level
of deterrence. They begin with the twin premises that strict liability often will
provide correct incentives but that strict liability may have the perverse effect
of discouraging policing. The solution to this dilemma, they conclude, will often be a “composite liability” scheme that separately punishes an entity’s
88
wrongdoing and its “failure to discharge its policing duties.”
Arlen and
Kraakman erect an impressive theoretical structure, but they slide too easily
over a weakness in their structure’s foundation. That weakness is that a legal
system can punish failures to police (or, which is the same thing, reward policing) only very imperfectly. Arlen and Kraakman acknowledge that our ability
89
to reward policing is an issue, but in the end they assume rather than prove
85. See, e.g., Gruner & Brown, supra note 12; Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 12.
86. The Justice Department’s Criminal Division has indicated that a good corporation’s compliance program may lessen the chances that the Division will file a criminal case:
The Department knows that no compliance program can eliminate all criminal activity committed by rogue employees, according to [the Criminal Division’s Robert] Litt. “We are not
going to prosecute a corporation every time an employee commits a crime,” he said. “A
company with a compliance program is less likely to be prosecuted for acts of rogue employees.”
Matthew J. Merrick, Sentencing Commission Takes on Corporate Crime, 8 FED. SENTENCING RPTR.
238, 243 (1996) (summarizing U.S. Sentencing Commission symposium, Sept. 7-8, 1995).
87. See generally Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 9 (advocating a modified due diligence standard).
88. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 726.
89. Id. at 711. “The ability of duty-based liability regimes to regulate firms’ policing measures
thus depends largely on how competently lawmakers and judges can articulate and assess the optimal
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that courts can, for instance, determine whether a firm “performs all of its po90
licing duties optimally.” In my view, they underestimate the difficulty of designing and then shoe-horning companies into approved compliance models,
and of distinguishing genuinely effective (although unsuccessful) programs
from ones that merely appear to be effective. Rewards for an approved policing program may create their own suboptimal incentives if it would otherwise
be more efficient for a firm to deter crime by hiring carefully, adjusting compensation incentives, establishing a culture of compliance, or increasing penalties for non-compliance, for instance. Rewarding approved policing would
lessen otherwise prospective punishments for law violations, and I doubt that
the tradeoff is often worth it.
V
THE ROLE OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
In an earlier paper, I identified and reviewed three potentially positive roles
for civil antitrust class actions: supplemental deterrence, compensation, and
91
identification of wrongdoing. Those roles are potentially more important for
private litigation, as is discussed below. Private litigation contributes in other
ways that are worthy of attention. In particular, private litigation is important
to the evolution of legal doctrine, to provide a safety valve, and to contribute to
92
protecting the actual and perceived integrity of the antitrust system.
A. Supplemental Deterrence
Private antitrust enforcement was once viewed as essential to the punishing
of wrongful behavior identified by an antitrust agency. The antitrust agencies
lacked meaningful ability to punish, so without follow-on private litigation
93
there could be no significant punishment.
Increased federal penalties for criminal antitrust violations obviously reduce the importance of deterrence through follow-on litigation. As noted ear94
lier, authorized penalties have soared in size and may increase further, and
penalties as applied very recently have risen sharply. Similarly, perpetrators of
hard-core fraud risk serious consequences from litigation brought by the FTC
95
and allied federal agencies and state attorneys general.

scope and forms of monitoring.” Id. at 716 (footnote omitted). “Of course, a duty-based regime can
solve the credibility problem only if the court can determine whether the firm has implemented efficient enforcement measures.” Id.
90. Id. at 727; see id. at 711 (noting difficulty of evaluating monitoring).
91. See Calkins, supra note 3, at 437-44.
92. Although the same roles of deterrence, compensation, and identification that are potentially
important for class actions are perhaps even more important for private litigation generally, private
litigation contributes in other ways that are worthy of attention. In particular, private litigation is important for evolution of legal doctrine, to provide a safety valve, and to contribute to protecting the
actual and perceived integrity of the antitrust system.
93. See Calkins, supra note 3.
94. See id.
95. See id.

CALKINS.FMT

150

09/30/98 3:30 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 60: No. 3

The increase in federal criminal penalties has not eliminated the need for
supplemental deterrence of hard core price fixing, at least. (The jury is still out
96
on consumer fraud. ) Until very recently, government penalties for pricefixing were so far removed from optimal levels that they could not be consid97
ered an effective deterrent at all. That has changed, yet optimal levels for
price-fixing may be sufficiently high that there is little risk that penalties will
achieve that level. The Division’s current push to ratchet penalties up by an98
other factor of ten is an implicit recognition that its current authority to penalize cannot result in the efficient imposition of adequate fines. Historically,
99
antitrust courts have imposed little in the way of penalties; so one cannot be
confident, even with new legislation, what the pattern of penalization will be in
the future.
One special role for private antitrust, however, is the imposing of adverse
consequences on persons who engage in misconduct falling short of being
criminal or fraudulent. The Antitrust Division and the FTC regularly file civil
challenges alleging conduct that appears fairly clearly illegal. These are civil
cases, however, and the agencies almost never seek or obtain anything more
than a prospective order to end and prevent recurrence of the challenged conduct. Nonpunitive prospective relief orders are not designed to deter misconduct.
Two recent Justice Department consent decrees illustrate the situation.
100
United States v. Tom Paige Catering Co. concluded a singularly offensive episode (if the allegations are true). The only two bidders on the meal contract offered by the Cleveland Head Start program, 1992-94, ended their competition
101
by forming a “joint venture.” Prices increased; cold lunches that cost $1.01 in
102
1993 cost sixty-eight percent more in late 1994, when competition had ended.
In spite of this sorry tale, the Division agreed to settle the matter for merely an
103
injunction assuring future competition.
Similarly, when IBM and StorateTek allegedly contractually eliminated
competition between them over the multibillion-dollar disk-storage subsystems
for mainframe computers, thus slowing the previously rapid decline in prices,
the Division settled the matters for a consent order that may or may not restore
96. Cf. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra note 28 (preliminary assessment).
97. See supra notes 14-26, 76-77 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 25, 76.
100. No. 1:97CV3268 (N.D. Ohio filed Dec. 16, 1997), noted in 6 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 45,097.
101. United States v. Tom Paige Catering, Inc., Competitive Impact Statement, 62 Fed. Reg.
67,897, 67,900 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 67,900-901 (effect of proposed judgment on competition). Although Tom Paige is a
good example of a case of clear wrongdoing that may go unpunished, it may not be an example specifically of the potential for private litigation to supplement civil governmental enforcement. It appears
that the victim in Tom Paige was the government itself. Perhaps the government refrained from
seeking the treble damages to which it was entitled, 15 U.S.C. § 145a (1994), because of the small size
of the conspiracy. Cf. 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,899 (annual value of contracts was between $300,000 and
$500,000).
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104

competition.
The Division considered seeking damages on governmental
purchases, but elected not to because further litigation would delay ending the
105
anticompetitive agreements.
The FTC also regularly challenges conduct apparently violative of the core
of antitrust. In each of the past two years, the FTC found that certain horizontal restraints among trade associations were illegal per se. The FTC condemned
the California Dentist’s Association for banning truthful price advertising and
the International Society of Conference Interpreters for limiting price competi106
tion. Earlier, the FTC prevailed in important cases challenging horizontal re107
108
strictions by Indiana dentists and Detroit auto dealers.
In each instance,
the FTC entered only prospective relief (usually ordering an end to the challenged conduct).
The FTC also challenges without punishing fairly clearly illegal conduct as
part of its consumer protection mission. The most recent example concerns the
advertising of premium gasoline, which, despite its substantially greater cost, is
109
of little benefit to most engines. In 1992, the FTC filed a complaint and accompanying consent order that challenged Sun Company’s allegedly unsupported claims that its high-octane gasolines “provide superior engine power
110
and acceleration.” Two years later, the agency filed a complaint and accompanying consent order that challenged Unocal Corporation’s allegedly unsupported claims that its high-octane gasoline “provides superior engine perform111
ance and longevity.”
Another two years later, the agency filed a complaint

104. See United States v. IBM, No. 97-3040 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 18, 1997), noted in 6 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,097; see also 63 Fed. Reg. 1499 (1998) (competitive impact statement and notice of
proposed relief).
105. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 1507. For another important civil Division challenge to restrictive licenses,
see United States v. General Elec. Co., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,765 (D. Mont. 1997).
106. See International Ass’n of Conference Interpreters, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 235 (Feb.
19, 1997); California Dental Ass’n, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,007 (Mar. 25, 1996) (invoking per se
rule and truncated rule of reason), aff’d, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) (based solely on truncated rule of
reason), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1998) (No. 97-1625).
107. See FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
108. See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 955
F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992).
109. But cf. David Ivanovich, Exxon Feels the Burn of Its Gas Ads, HOUSTON CHRONICLE
INTERACTIVE (June 24, 1997), available at <http://www.chron.com/content/archive/> (American Petroleum Institute concluded that “‘Overbuying of premium gasolines is not prevalent, if it occurs at
all.’”). See, e.g., Tom Magliozzi & Ray Magliozzi, Car Talk, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 25, 1997 (“Highoctane gasoline is absolutely no benefit to the vast majority of cars.”).
110. Sun Co., 115 F.T.C. 560, 561 (1992). Commissioner Owen dissented because she viewed the
remedy as insufficient. Id. at 569. As Commissioner Owen noted 20 years earlier, the FTC had condemned Sun Co. for misrepresenting the benefits of what it then described as its “custom blended”
gasoline, which purportedly meant that all of its gasoline were unusual because they were “blended
with action of Sunoco 260, the highest octane gasoline at any station, anywhere.” Sun Oil Co., 84
F.T.C. 247, 249 (1974) (complaint paragraph 10A). After trial, the Administrative Law Judge entered
an order barring certain misrepresentations, which was not appealed by Sun and became final. The
ALJ rejected complaint counsel’s request for corrective advertising because, given the energy crisis
then being endured, he found that “it is not likely that power and high octane ratings will be advertised
in the near future.” Id. at 279.
111. Unocal Corp., 117 F.T.C. 500, 503 (1994). The FTC’s order also was imposed (by consent) on
Unocal’s advertising agency, Leo Burnett Company, Inc. Id. at 509-11.
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and accompanying consent order, this time challenging Amoco Oil Co.’s allegedly unsupported claim that, among other things, its premium gasoline is
“superior . . . with respect to engine performance and environmental bene112
fits.”
Less than twelve months later, the FTC filed yet another complaint,
113
challenging Exxon Corp.’s claims about its premium gasoline. Exxon agreed
114
to a consent order the following year.
By itself, this pattern of company after company being sued for essentially
the same violation is remarkable. The remarkable becomes the extraordinary
115
when one compares the challenged advertisements, which are eerily similar.
112. Amoco Oil Co., No. 932-301161, 1996 FTC LEXIS 40 (Jan. 2, 1996) (consent agreement), order entered, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,613 (1996).
113. See Exxon Corp., No. 9281 (F.T.C. filed Sept. 11, 1996), noted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
24,106.
114. See Exxon Corp., 62 Fed. Reg. 25,816 (1997) (proposed consent agreement), order entered, 5
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,288 (Sept. 12, 1997). The proposed Exxon order is somewhat narrower
than the orders previously entered, but Exxon would be ordered to run a 15-second “consumer education” commercial about octane and to distribute a specified brochure on the subject. See 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,117 (analysis to aid public comment). Commissioner Azcuenaga dissented from this
tradeoff. Id. (Azcuenaga, Comm’r, dissenting in part). She found the commercial “uninspired at best”
and unlikely to be effective. Id. at 24,188. See generally Exxon, FTC Reach Settlement on Ads for
High-Octane Gas, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1997, at A6 (reporting settlement, noting that “[b]oth the FTC
and Exxon described the required advertising as “educational” rather than corrective); Exxon, FTC to
Settle Advertising Dispute, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, June 25, 1997, at B4 (noting that “[s]ome
industry analysts had predicted the FTC would ask for ‘corrective advertising’”); David Segal, Taming
the Octane of the Ads, WASH. POST, June 25, 1997, at C11 (reporting settlement).
115. Excerpts from ads quoted in the complaints are as follows:
From Sun Co. (1992):
1. Announcer: When you car’s your baby. . . . (Sing: Nothin’s too good for my baby. . . .) No
other gasoline can give your car better acceleration. Because no other gasoline has 94 octane–the highest octane under the sun. . . .
Announcer: What’s so special about Sunoco Ultra 94? No other gasoline can give your car
better acceleration. Because no other gasoline has 94 octane–the highest octane under the
sun. . . . Come to Sunoco and fill up with Ultra 94–for maximum power and performance.
115 F.T.C. at 561.
From Unocal Corporation (1994):
1. With the high cost of falling in love these days you can’t trust your investment to just any
gasoline. That’s why Seventy-Six developed our Ninety-two Unleaded. It’s the highest level
octane you can buy to help your car run better, longer. Because after all isn’t love supposed
to last forever? . . .
3. . . . Unocal’s 89 unleaded is two octanes higher than regular unleaded to keep your car running better, longer. . . . Compared to regular unleaded, our 89 octane will give your car
smoother starts and stops, help reduce engine knocks and pings.
117 F.T.C. at 50102.
From Amoco Oil Co. (1996):
Amoco Ultimate is the only premium refined an extra step to remove harmful impurities
other premiums leave in. Impurities that can rob your engine of performance and pollute the
air.. . .
It’s your car. Your baby. Your one and only. Everything about it has to be as good as
gold. And when you’re running on Amoco Ultimate, you’re running clean. Amoco Ultimate
is refined an extra step for quality. . . .
One fill-up of Amoco Ultimate will clean up [your] clogged fuel injectors just like that.
And [you] won’t run as sluggish as [you] do now. . . .
Higher octane Amoco Silver can bring back the acceleration. Bring back the power.
Complaint paragraph 4.
From Exxon Corporation (1997):
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It appears almost as though the FTC’s complaints and orders provided creative
inspiration instead of sobering deterrence.
Given the similarity of these advertising campaigns, it is clear that the
threat of an FTC investigation and lawsuit provided relatively little deterrence,
116
compared with the prospective gains from the proposed commercials.
It is
117
also clear that the prospect of Lanham Act litigation, which one competitor
can bring against another, was of little deterrence. Although optimal deterrence is difficult to measure, it seems unlikely that the FTC provided the socially optimal level of deterrence of exaggerated advertising of premium gaso118
line, an expensive product of little value to most consumers.
When government agencies challenge conduct that appears to be clearly illegal, and yet the only punishment (other than the cost and inconvenience of
litigating) is living with a prospective nonpunitive order, then private litigation
119
has a deterrence role to play. The Antitrust Division’s civil program, and the
FTC’s competitive and nonfraud-based consumer protection programs, challenge without punishing what the agencies see as misconduct. Questionable
proposed mergers are a (very large) special category: Deterrence is not an issue because so many mergers are procompetitive and questionable mergers are
almost always disclosed to the agencies for advance review. Some other challenged conduct is borderline (and some may be lawful, and wrongly challenged), but other challenged activity is sufficiently wrong that it merits deterrence. Under the current approach of federal enforcers, private litigation is the
only available source of deterrence.

Announcer: New Exxon 93 Supreme keeps your engine cleaner.
Woman 2: Clean is good.
Announcer: So it can help drive down maintenance costs. . . .
Woman 2: Gas that can save you money.
Announcer: For more reliable performance.
Complaint Paragraph 4.
116. See Laney Salisbury, Exxon to Refute Previous Gasoline Claims in FTC Deal (June 24, 1997),
available at <http://biz.yahoo.com/finance/97/06/24/xon_z0009_2.html> (“Traders and analysts say
premium earns twice as much in profits as regular and it is unlikely oil companies will give it up anytime soon.”).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
118. For the classic study finding that firms whose advertising is challenged by the FTC suffer losses
in the product, advertising, and capital markets, see Sam Peltzman, The Effects of FTC Advertising
Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1981). Whether or not Peltzman was (and continues to be) right, it is
obvious that the FTC does not deter all misleading advertising (nor would society want such a high
level of deterrence), and the experience with premium gasoline suggests that even a fairly clear risk of
FTC action does not deter clearly misleading ads likely to contribute significantly to profits. Additional deterrence seems warranted, albeit on impressions rather than hard empiricism.
119. Federal enforcement also can be supplemented by state action. For instance, last fall, an FTC
administrative law judge found that Toys ‘R’ Us had violated the FTC Act. See In re Toys “R” Us, No.
9278 (F.T.C. Sept. 30, 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9709/toysrus.pdf> (initial decision).
Within days of the decision, the state of New York filed a suit against the firm, thus joining class actions filed in three federal courts. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Toys ‘R’ Us Could Become Suits ‘R’ Us,
NAT’L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at B1. Any lack of punitive provisions in the judge’s order could be offset by
the related litigation. (Of course, if the FTC’s suit is unmerited, or if the challenged conduct should be
changed but not punished, the related litigation imposes additional unfortunate costs.)
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B. Compensation
Compensation becomes a more important feature of private antitrust litigation once one expands beyond class actions. Antitrust plaintiffs continue to win
120
If de(or achieve through settlement) substantial, hard-money recoveries.
served, recoveries are particularly valuable since they compensate for harms
that are probably not insurable.
Whether these recoveries are always deserved is another matter. Commentators regularly have worried about the abuse of antitrust litigation, particularly
121
by competitor plaintiffs.
Antitrust courts have responded with procedural
and substantive decisions that facilitate the early disposition of unmeritorious
122
123
cases, but worries remain.
What remains uncontroverted is that plaintiffs
do win substantial recoveries and thus earn compensation for real or perceived
injuries.
C. Identification of Wrongdoing
124

My earlier paper explained that class actions, rather than just following
behind government efforts, have helped initiate the challenging of questionable
125
activities. For instance, the massive NASDAQ, Brand Name Prescription
126
127
Drugs, and Insurance Antitrust Litigation proceedings all had origins in
class actions separate from federal antitrust initiatives. Any suggestion that
128
class actions merely follow where the federal government has led cannot
withstand the evidence of current practice.
When one considers private actions more generally, and not just class actions, the role of private antitrust in identifying alleged wrongdoing is even
more pronounced. Eighty percent or more of antitrust cases do not follow on
129
government actions.
The heart of antitrust continues to be private litiga120. See, e.g., In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., No. 94 Civ. 3996 (filed Dec. 31,
1997), noted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 31 (Jan. 15, 1998) (preliminarily approving settlements totaling more than $1 billion, which were expected to be the largest antitrust settlement
ever); see also Calkins, supra note 91, at 419-23 (possible renaissance of antitrust class actions).
121. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28
J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1991). But cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected
Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1989).
122. See Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The Second Annual Bernstein Lecture, 72
ST. JOHN’S U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
123. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 60-62 (1994) (worrying that Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), might stimulate efficiency-reducing litigation).
124. See Calkins, supra note 3.
125. In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 71,981 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 16, 1997) (preliminary approval of settlement).
126. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997).
127. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see also Insurance Companies Settle
Multistate Conspiracy Charges, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1684, at 434 (Oct. 13, 1994).
128. Cf. Coffee, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick,” supra note 12, at 435.
129. See Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases That Follow On Government Cases, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING, 329, 358
(Lawrence J. White ed., 1988).
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tion.
Unless those cases are unmeritorious, there are far more antitrust
wrongs than federal enforcers are funded to handle.
D. Evolution of Legal Doctrine
Private antitrust litigation has been essential to the development of modern
antitrust doctrine. This contribution of private antitrust is fairly recent, and it is
131
sometimes unappreciated.
As a small, unscientific experiment, I took the
132
newest antitrust law school casebook and examined the sixty principal cases.
Of the thirty-seven issued before 1977 (the watershed year of Continental TV,
133
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania ), only seven, or nineteen percent, were private suits. Of
the twenty-three opinions issued starting that year, seventeen, or seventy-six
percent, were private suits—and that figure does not include the Court’s most
134
recent opinion, State Oil Co. v. Khan. Without private cases, there would be
no antitrust case books. The leading modern cases to which one looks for guid135
136
ance about monopolization, attempted monopolization, resale price main137
138
139
140
141
tenance, sole outlets, territorial limitations, vertical agreements, tying,
142
143
price discrimination, and exemptions are almost entirely private cases. An130. During the 12-month period ending March 31, 1997, 569 private antitrust suits were filed in
federal district courts, compared to only three civil antitrust suits by or against the United States. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: 1997, at
40-41 (1997). During the 12-month period ending September 30, 1996, the comparable figures are 647
and 42, respectively. See LEONIDAS R. MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS: 1996
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 136 (1996).
131. But cf. Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1677, 1692-94 (1995)
(noting relative increase in importance in private litigation).
132. PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1997).
133. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
134. 118 S. Ct. 257 (1997).
135. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
136. See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
137. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
495 U.S. 328 (1990); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
138. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
139. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
140. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. SprayRite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
141. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
142. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Texaco v.
Hasbrouk, 496 U.S. 543 (1990); Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983). But cf.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948);
Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
143. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.,
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499
U.S. 365 (1991); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). But cf. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411
(1990); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
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titrust law is, in large part, law crafted through private litigation. The field is
richer, and counselors can give advice with more precision and confidence, because of the existence of private-litigation-generated case law. Those areas of
antitrust that have been the subject of substantial litigation have achieved no144
tably more certainty and predictability.
To be sure, nothing prevents the antitrust agencies from litigating more
cases and contributing more to the judicial development of the law. Assistant
Attorney General Klein has spoken of the importance of litigating cases and
145
developing doctrine in the courts, so the Division may bring more cases. The
FTC has streamlined its adjudicative rules so as to facilitate the efficient adju146
dication of disputes.
Yet the agencies thus far have litigated few civil nonmerger cases, and this seems unlikely to change dramatically. During the past
seven fiscal years, the FTC has filed a total of only eight administrative compe147
tition complaints (merger and non-merger).
Between 1980 and 1996, the
CCH Trade Regulation Reporter shows a total of only ten civil Antitrust Divi148
sion cases (merger or non-merger). Between fiscal years 1981 and 1997, the
Division filed a total of only eight Sherman Act section 2 cases, and six of those
cases were filed in the last six years. In only three of the past ten fiscal years
did the Division file more than three Sherman Act civil section 1 cases. In the
149
other years, the Division averaged only 1.7 complaints a year.
Government antitrust litigation is unlikely to increase dramatically, for
many of the same reasons that it has declined. Those reasons include the fearfully high cost of litigation and the interest in preserving benign aspects of pro150
posed transactions.
Even if the antitrust agencies do consider the “positive
externality” of law development when computing the costs and benefits of pro-

144. See generally Calkins, supra note 91. The antitrust agencies have contributed greatly to the
development of antitrust theory and doctrine through the use of guidelines, reports, speeches, and consent orders (although consent orders are tea leaves requiring considerable interpretation). The leading two-volume antitrust text includes excerpts from four statutes covering 40 pages, see ANTITRUST
SECTION, supra note 20, at 1357-1406, and from seven sets of guidelines covering 223 pages, id. at
1407-1623. In recent years, the antitrust agencies have enhanced access to these materials by making
See <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/>;
them available on agency internet home pages.
<http://www.ftc.gov/>. But guidelines, reports, speeches, and consent orders lack the power of case
law, as is discussed elsewhere. See id.
145. See John R. Wilke & Bryan Gruley, Trustbuster Joel Klein, Once Viewed as Timid, Faces a
Very Full Plate, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1998, at A1, A10.
146. See Robert Pitofsky, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the U. S. House of Representatives Concerning An Overview of FTC Antitrust Enforcement (Nov. 5, 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9711/oversigh.htm>. See generally Calkins, supra note 91.
147. The last fiscal year in which more than two such complaints were filed was 1990, with five
complaints. These figures exclude court complaints, in which the FTC has sought a preliminary injunction against a merger, but they include the companion administrative complaints challenging those
mergers. Complaints of matters that were not litigated to a conclusion also are included.
148. Computed from tables listed under “U.S. Litigated Antitrust Cases” in the back of published
CCH volumes from calendar years 1980-96.
149. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 62. In fiscal years 1994-96, the Division filed eight, 12,
and 14 civil section 1 complaints, respectively. See id.
150. See generally Calkins, supra note 122.
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spective litigation (as they should), it seems unlikely that government litigation can increase sufficiently to displace the law-development role of private
152
cases.
E. Safety Valve
Private antitrust also plays a special role as something of a safety-valve.
Persons injured by what they reasonably believe to be illegal conduct can have
their day in court. Assuming that the law is reasonably clear—and private litigation has contributed substantially to clarifying the law—it can be invoked by
big firms and little alike.
The alternative would be to rely on government enforcers. This is not a realistic alternative for the foreseeable future because of resource constraints.
Beyond that, it is healthy that firms unable to interest a government agency in
their cause can, if they deem the cause sufficiently important, proceed to a tribunal. That option also contributes to the healthy functioning of the antitrust
system, for reasons that follow.
F. The Integrity of the Antitrust System
Antitrust has become a form of economic regulation. “The Regulatory
Character of Modern Antitrust Policy” was the topic for one of the January
1998 programs sponsored by the antitrust and economic regulation section of
the Association of American Law Schools. As has been chronicled elsewhere,
the antitrust agencies have left their gun-slinging, “we’re just law enforcers,”
153
image behind. This has important consequences for private litigation.
It was almost inevitable that government antitrust became more regulatory,
beginning in 1976 when the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was passed. Between fiscal
years 1992 and 1997, the number of mergers reported to the agencies more than

151. See id.
152. One reason government cannot entirely displace private litigation’s role in law-creation is because law develops in part when plaintiffs lose. Indeed, many of the cases that have clarified antitrust
have been cases lost by plaintiffs, and rightfully so—cases the government should not have brought.
Indeed, because “big bounties” can “make bad law,” Coffee, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick,”
supra note 12, at 438, it is important for government agencies to work as amici for defendants (as the
two agencies did in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275) as well as for plaintiffs.
153. See Calkins, supra note 122; Harry First, Is Antitrust “Law”?, 10 ANTITRUST 9, 9 (Fall 1995)
(increased use of consent decrees); Thomas E. Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws:
Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (1990); A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The
New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 13 (Fall 1995) (arguing that evolution of antitrust law into a form
of regulation is in part a by-product of the increasing use of consent decrees as the primary means of
antitrust enforcement); Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, 10
ANTITRUST 4, 4 (Fall 1995) (practical importance of trend toward consent decree resolutions); see also
John R. Wilke & Bryan Gruley, Merger Monitors: Acquisitions Can Mean Long-Lasting Scrutiny By
Antitrust Agencies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1997, at A1 (“Today’s lawyers prepare for negotiations by
trying to figure out how to satisfy the enforcers, not the law.”). The Antitrust Division recently
formed an International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to advise it on international antitrust
policy issues. See Justice Department Forms New Group to Advise Division on Antitrust Policy, 73 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 517 (Nov. 27, 1997). Such reaching out to eminent advisers is entirely consistent with a regulatory perspective.
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154

doubled, from 1,589 to 3,702. Some of these mergers—such as the telecommunications transactions investigated by the Antitrust Division, and the Time
Warner/Turner Broadcasting and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas mergers investigated by the FTC—are extraordinarily complex. Evaluating them is a massive
155
undertaking.
Where possible, the antitrust agencies seek to preserve the procompetitive
156
or benign parts of proposed transactions. The agencies recognize that merg157
ers can generate efficiencies and enhance competition. Yet litigation is costly
and uncertain, and the courtroom is a poor place to practice the kind of detailed surgery needed to excise objectionable parts of proposed mergers.
Similarly, the antitrust agencies have shown considerable interest in permitting
158
the unobjectionable aspects of coordination among competitors to continue.
In a wide variety of situations, agencies can accomplish more by negotiation
159
than confrontation.
The antitrust agencies and the antitrust system nonetheless pay an inevitable price for becoming more regulatory. The “I’m a law enforcer” shield was a

154. See Pitofsky, supra note 146; Leslie Wayne, Wave of Mergers Is Recasting Face of Business in
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1998, at A3.
155. For a skeptical examination of the changed nature of antitrust merger practice, see Joe Sims &
Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case
Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865
(1997).
156. A singular example is provided by Shell Oil Co., No. 971 0026 (Dec. 19, 1997) (proposed consent agreement), noted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,362 (analysis to aid public comment). The
FTC tentatively approved creation of the largest refiner and marketer of petroleum products in the
U.S., see FTC, Press Release (Dec. 19, 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/9712/shell.htm>, in
return for some divestitures (which is normal) and entry of a highly regulatory 10-year supply agreement (which is not). The FTC’s analysis to aid public comment argues that the joint venture would
permit the new interest to control a heated pipeline near San Francisco, the source of crude oil for that
pipeline, and substantial part of the capacity to receive that oil and make asphalt for Northern California, which would harm competition by disadvantaging the only other substantial Northern California
asphalt supplier (which buys crude oil transported through that pipeline). The FTC states that the
consent order “eliminates this risk” through a 10-year supply agreement at prices approved by the
FTC. It seems more likely, however, that the consent order would prevent price increases for ten
years. Presumably, the FTC decided to sacrifice competition in subsequent years in exchange for efficiency gains from the venture. (Since the FTC is not explicit about this trade-off, we cannot know
whether the efficiency gains were in this market or some other market.)
157. See 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 (1992 Merger Guidelines, revised April 8, 1997, to
clarify treatment of efficiencies.)
158. See, e.g., William J. Baer, New Myths and Old Realities, Perspectives on Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Before the Bar Association of the City of New York (Nov.
17, 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/bany.htm> (“Where intervention is necessary [in innovation market transactions], we seek to craft relief carefully to remedy the competitive
problem without interfering with the incentives and ability to engage in other R&D.”); Joel I. Klein,
Statement Before the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee, Senate Judiciary
Committee (Feb. 26, 1998), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/testimony/1581.htm> (“The majority of mergers do not threaten to harm competition and consumers; often, they can increase efficiency,
improve research and development, and lower prices to consumers. Because of these benefits, even
when we do have reason to believe a merger as proposed may be anticompetitive, we look for a way to
prevent the anticompetitive aspects of the merger from going forward, while not prohibiting parts of
the deal that do not raise anticompetitive concerns.”).
159. Cf. John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 179 (1984).
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powerful (if not entirely effective ) way to deflect political and quasi-political
attempts to influence enforcement decisions. Once the shield is lowered, there
are sure to be more attempts to exert influence over the agencies.
One can discern an increasingly wide-spread belief that antitrust enforce161
ment is just as susceptible to public pressure as other forms of regulation.
162
Microsoft is chided for not playing the Washington regulatory game, and
even confesses that it may have erred in how it presented its position (although,
163
obviously, not in its position itself).
Microsoft’s opponents rally the faithful
164
to lobby the Justice Department.
160. Compare Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365
(1970) (political party in power does not affect quality or quantity of enforcement), with Malcolm B.
Coate et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 22 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1990) (political
pressure increases FTC merger challenges). For a recent review of the politics of antitrust, see Declan
available at
McCullagh, In God We Antitrust, THE NETLY NEWS (Jan. 9, 1998)
<http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly>. One of the more notorious examples of alleged interference occurred when, after Intentional Telephone & Telegraph contributed heavily to the 1972 Republican
Convention, President Richard Nixon intervened in its favor. “‘I don’t know whether ITT is bad, good
or indifferent,’ he said on April 19, 1971, White House tapes reveal. “But there is not going to be any
more antitrust actions as long as I am in this chair . . . g-d—- it, we’re going to stop it.’”
161. Cf., e.g., E-mail from Robert S. Frank to <AT-MEMBERS@abanet.org> (Feb. 9, 1998) (on
file with author) (claiming that you cannot understand why two hospitals in Manchester, N.H., were
permitted to merge “unless and until you talk with the then-current political representatives from the
State of New Hampshire”); E-mail from Charles Mueller to <antitrust@essential.org> (Jan. 5, 1998)
(on file with author) (crediting the FTC’s preventing Staples and Office Depot from merging to the
“coaching” and “cheerleading” of James Love of the consumer Project on Technology) (“Would that
Staples/OD merger would have been stopped without his efforts? I don’t think so.”). For an earlier
discussion of this theme, see generally Calkins, supra note 122.
162. See David Segal, Five Ways to Blow it With the Feds: At Justice or FTC, A Little Respect Goes a
Long Way, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1997, at C1 (Suggesting that Microsoft had offended the Antitrust
Division by boasting that the consent decree entered against it would have no effect: “Veterans of the
game say that corporations and their lawyers often forget that antitrust law, especially as it is practiced
in Washington, is both science and art, a few parts data and a few parts diplomacy.”); see also David
Segal, Setting Up the Showdown, WASH. POST, May 17, 1998, at H1 (describing what are seen as Microsoft’s missteps).
163. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Which Way the Windows, THE NETLY NEWS (Jan. 13, 1998),
available at <http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1685,00.html> (senior Microsoft executives roamed Washington, D.C., apologizing for their previous arrogance and saying they had been
misunderstood).
164. See Statement by Ralph Nader on DOJ’s Microsoft Action, forwarded by James Love to
<antitrust@essential.org> (Oct. 20, 1997) (on file with author) (“The Consumer Project on Technology
recently circulated a letter about the browser issue on the Internet. . . . Over 1,500 computer users and
high tech businesses urged the Department of Justice to take steps that could prevent Microsoft from
using anticompetitive practices to monopolize the Browser market . . . .”). Charles Mueller, writing to
a Ralph Nader-affiliated internet list, urged on what he viewed as his allies:
Why can’t each of us write . . . a letter to Reno . . . that sums up our sense of the facts involved in Microsoft’s monopoly, our appraisal of its costs, and our concerns as to what it
means for the future of the industry and the country? . . . Why can’t we, at a minimum, write
her a note with an attachment—the attachment being what we consider the two or three more
best posts to this list?
You bet she’ll read them. And, bureaucracy being what it is, she’ll pass them down to
Joel Klein and his 300 lawyers and economists in the Antitrust Division with a note suggesting rather strongly that they, too, read them.
The last time I checked this list had only 270 members. A dozen good letters could have a
profound effect at Justice.
E-mail from Charles Mueller to <antitrust@essential.org> (Nov. 11, 1997) (on file with author). Microsoft spokesman Mark Murray has complained about the current lobbying: “It’s absolutely clear
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Pressure is brought to bear on the Antitrust Division and the FTC both directly and indirectly, by lobbying Congress. Butterworth and Blodgett hospitals managed to persuade the Senate that it should deny the FTC funding for an
165
adjudication the hospitals were not sure they could win. Before the full Congress could act, the FTC saved them the trouble by dismissing the adjudicative
166
complaint.
When the FTC was adjudicating a claim that New Balance was
claiming its shoes were “made in America” without meeting the traditional “all
or virtually all” test, New Balance responded by protesting to the New England
congressional delegation, which even asked chairman designate Robert Pitof167
sky about the issue during his confirmation hearings.
The FTC stayed the
proceedings and scheduled public workshops to consider whether to fashion a
new standard, more appropriate for an increasingly independent world econ168
omy. The FTC withdrew its complaint against New Balance in exchange for
169
what a dissenting commissioner attacked as an “eviscerated” order, and the
170
FTC proposed a new, more permissive standard. Then the public, labor unions, and members of Congress protested the proposed new standard, and the
171
FTC abandoned it.
The unhappy lesson suggested by incidents such as these is that political influence is a necessary tool in the arsenal of weapons employed by antitrust and
that our competitors are spending an enormous amount of time and money trying to whip up antiMicrosoft sentiment in Washington, D.C. For the past year, Netscape, Sun, and other competitors
have been crawling all over Washington, D.C., trying to use the government as a weapon against Microsoft–rather than competing head-to-head in the marketplace.” McCullagh, supra note 160.
165. See S. Res. 1022, 105th Cong. (1997) (“Provided further, That, for a period of one year, none
of the funds made available to the Federal Trade Commission shall be spent on an administrative proceeding concerning them merger of two hospitals where the commission has already sought injunctive
relief under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and prior to July 98, 1997, a court of appeals has affirmed the denial of
the injunctive relief requested by the Commission unless further review overturns by the decision by
the court of appeals.”); see SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON S. RES.
1022 (1997) (reviewing and strongly opposing the measure).
166. See Butterworth Health Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,334 (Sept. 25, 1997) (dismissing
complaint).
167. See FTC Nomineee Assesses Competition Policy, Domestic-Content Labeling in Global Market,
68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 85 (Jan. 26, 1995); see also Consumer Outpouring Prompts
Return to Tough “Made in U.S.A.” Standard, F.T.C. WATCH, No. 490 (Dec. 8 , 1997) (“The [FTC] staff
used the ‘all or virtually all’ standard when it fought ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ claims until members of the
Massachusetts delegation in Congress, prodded by shoemaker New Balance, hammered the FTC for
using what it deemed an ‘outmoded’ standard. Their criticisms prompted the FTC to reevaluate its
policy.”).
168. See New Balance Athletic Shoes, Inc., No. 9268 (July 10, 1995) (order staying proceedings and
to show cause why the complaint should not be amended or dismissed), noted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 23,857; see generally Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC to Conduct Comprehensive Review of Consumer Perception of “Made in U.S.A.” Claims (July 11, 1995), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa.9507/hyde2.htm>.
169. In re New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 1996 FTC LEXIS 676, at 6 (Dec. 2, 1996) (Starek,
Comm’r, dissenting); see also In re New Balance, 1996 FTC LEXIS 228 (May 14, 1996) (withdrawing
matter from adjudication); 1996 FTC LEXIS 676, at 3 (Dec. 2, 1996) (decision and consent order barring New Balance from misrepresenting “[t]he quantity of footwear it exports” and “[t]hat footwear
made wholly abroad is made in the United States”).
170. See 62 Fed. Reg. 25,020 (1997).
171. See FTC WATCH, supra note 167. See generally Enforcement Policy Statement on U.S. Origin
Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756 (1997) (“the Commission will continue to enforce the Commission’s current ‘all or virtually all’ standard”).
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trade regulation lawyers. This is not to suggest that politics is all that matters,
or that it is important even in many cases. The observation is merely that, with
the increasingly regulatory nature of antitrust and trade regulation, observers
perceive that politics is commensurately increasing in importance.
Private litigation is a valuable antidote to concerns arising from the increasingly regulatory nature of antitrust and trade regulation. Private litigation
contributes strongly to the certainty and predictability of antitrust law. Time
and again we have seen courts be unwilling to allow a perceived treble damage
172
windfall to turn on some vague admonition. Standards of conduct that would
be acceptable in Europe, where a single agency can exercise prosecutorial discretion, would be unimaginable here. Private antitrust contributes to the existence of clear signals, which, in turn, minimize charges that antitrust enforce173
ment is unduly political.
Private antitrust also makes possible the extremely healthy response that, if
someone objects to a firm’s conduct and cannot interest the government, the
party often can file suit individually. Were an antitrust agency ever to be captured by the special interests so widely discussed in the media, and were the
agency wrongfully to refrain from proceeding against a favored firm, others
could step in. It is liberating to be able to say to someone asking for enforcement action that the agency does not see a law violation but the petitioner is
free to proceed alone if it desires. The very existence of private litigation alternatives likely lessens the frequency with which charges of influence arise. Private litigation thus helps preserve the actual and perceived integrity of the antitrust system.
VI
POSSIBLE MODEST IMPROVEMENTS
The above review covers a series of big issues that could call for big responses. Some would urge ending corporate criminal liability, some would urge
increasing carrots. The suggestions I make are more modest. They are set
forth and applied with respect to antitrust and trade regulation, but may also
have more general application.
A. Recognize the External Benefits of Litigation
The antitrust agencies, private litigants, and the antitrust system all benefit
when the agencies can and do litigate. Litigation, and its preservation as a vi172. Many of the cases mentioned above as contributing to the evolution of antitrust doctrine reflect the search for increasingly objective standards.
173. The converse is also true, of course. Private causes of action interfere with evolution of law
through non-enforcement. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 660 (5th ed.
1998) (public monopoly of enforcement makes possible the prosecutorial nullification of laws or particular applications thereof). Dean Sullivan presciently described the increase in power for regulatory
enforcers to shape antitrust law by non-enforcement. See E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division
as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (1986). At least
until the past decade or so, the American antitrust enforcement system had opted in general for clarity
and evolution through the judiciary.
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able alternative to settlement or dismissal, keeps enforcers and defendants
honest and fair. Litigation establishes universally enforceable standards. And
litigation preserves the capability of litigating, which is essential for the system
to function effectively.
Litigation thus yields benefits far in excess of any improved outcome in a
particular case. Although no agency should litigate an unmeritorious case, or
litigate without hope of an improved outcome, the cost-benefit analysis employed to decide whether to expend resources litigating should recognize not
just the potential benefit in the case at issue, but also the externality benefit to
the system as a whole.
Both antitrust agencies should factor in this externality benefit. In addition,
the FTC, which can adjudicate its own cases, should continue its work making
174
administrative adjudication a viable alternative to the federal courts. At the
same time, the agencies need to continue monitoring judicial developments in
private cases, and participate where they can contribute to improvements in the
175
law.
B. Develop Noncriminal Sanctions for Law Violations
The agencies’ bi-modal approach to sanctions is unfortunate, for the variety
of reasons discussed above. Expansion of “middle ground” deterrence would
be of significant benefit.
Despite the FTC’s now-common use of its authority to win consumer re176
dress and other equitable relief, there is surprisingly little established, helpful
wisdom about when such remedies are permitted and appropriate. The hallmarks of a “proper case,” for which a permanent injunction and/or other ancil177
lary relief may be sought, remain “ill-defined.” The many cases in which the
FTC has achieved consumer redress are typified by the apparent existence of
178
179
serious consumer fraud, but this does not appear to be a legal limitation,
174. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
175. Both antitrust agencies have implicitly recognized the importance of this role by making their
amicus curiae briefs available through the internet. See <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/app.html>;
<http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs.htm>.
176. The grounds on which the FTC seeks consumer redress are set out supra note 32.
177. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 604; see also 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994) (“[I]n proper
cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.”). Section 19(b), which authorized a federal court follow-on to a FTC proceeding that condemned an act or practice that “a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent,” offers a somewhat clearer standard, see supra note 32, but the FTC rarely brings
litigated Section 19(b) cases.
178. Cf. Paul, supra note 32, at 145 (FTC’s General Counsel lauded increased use of Section 13(b)
as “the most efficacious way to obtain quick and effective relief for, at a minimum, hard core unfair
and deceptive practices.”).
179. The principal legislative history describes only when the FTC can seek a permanent injunction
(without discussing redress or other equitable relief), and it is not a model of clarity even on that issue:
Provision is also made in section 210 for the Commission to seek and, after a hearing, for a
court to grant a permanent injunction. This will allow the Commission to seek a permanent
injunction when a court is reluctant to grant a temporary injunction because it cannot be assured of a [sic] early hearing on the merits. Since a permanent injunction could only be
granted after such a hearing, this will assure the court of the ability to set a definite hearing
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and, even if it were, “fraud” is an ill-defined term.
So, any fraud limitation
may be more a matter of FTC restraint than statutory language or judgecrafted doctrine. The FTC could increase deterrence and enhance the rule of
law were it to enunciate some standards for seeking redress or other ancillary
relief, and then litigate those standards until they achieve judicial acceptance or
rejection. Deterrence can be achieved only when persons expect consequences.
The FTC’s experience with redress is limited almost entirely to consumer
protection cases, but there are a few exceptions. The FTC first achieved consumer redress in an antitrust case in 1980, when crayon manufacturers accused
of coordinating prices agreed to pay $1.2 million in restitution for expected use
181
by public school systems. Although FTC Director of the Bureau of Competition Alfred Dougherty opined that “the agreements are significant because
they reflect the importance of including consumer redress in the [FTC]’s anti182
trust arsenal,” the FTC has rarely visited that part of its arsenal. The FTC’s
date. Furthermore, the Commission will have the ability, in the routine fraud case, to merely
seek a permanent injunction in those situations in which it does not desire to further expand
upon the prohibitions of the Federal Trade Commission Act through the issuance of a ceaseand-desist order.
S. REP. 93-151, at 30-31 (1973), quoted in FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Ninth Circuit early held that “a routine fraud case is a proper case” for seeking a permanent injunction. Id. (affirming grant of preliminary injunction and asset freeze). That Circuit subsequently
declined to limit section 13(b)’s authorization to seek permanent injunctions to cases of routine fraud.
See FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985) (dictum; denial of injunction affirmed because challenged practices were not likely to recur). The court viewed the Senate Report as contemplating permanent injunctions in “routine fraud” cases but also where courts were reluctant to grant
preliminary relief because of concern about the timeliness of any hearing on the merits. Id. It accepted the FTC’s argument that a “proper case” was shown whenever a violation of a law enforced by
the FTC was threatened sufficiently. Id. The Seventh Circuit, reviewing the same issue, concluded
that there was a “substantial argument” that the FTC can invoke section 13(b)’s reference to permanent injunctions “for any violation of a statute administered by the FTC,” and it was “quite clear that
Congress at least expected that the FTC could rely on this proviso when it sought to halt a straightforward violation of section 5 that required no application of the FTC’s expertise to a novel regulatory
issue through administrative proceedings.” FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d
1020, 1028 (7th Cir. 1988).
Few cases have further parsed the issue, which rarely arises. One early case suggested that section
13(b)’s authority to order rescission should be read with the standards of section 19, and limited to dishonest or fraudulent conduct. See FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
65,725, at 69,705 (N. D. Cal. 1983). More recent cases have taken a more expansive approach. See,
e.g., FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A corporation is liable for monetary
relief under section 13(b) if the F.T.C. shows that the corporation engaged in misrepresentations or
omissions of kind usually relied on by reasonably prudent persons and that consumer injury resulted.”)
(citation omitted) (district court wrongly refused to award unjust enrichment where respondent falsely
advertised anti-baldness product); FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. at 1291 (“Conduct which
violates Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, is a proper case for consumer redress under Section
13(b).”).
180. Cf. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d at 1028 (advertising $29 coupon for travel to
Hawaii, when actual cost of ticket was buried in other costs imposed on consumer, was “routine
fraud”); FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d at 1111 (false promises and false and misleading representations in connection with sale of franchises was “routine fraud”).
181. See Binney & Smith, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 625 (1980) (consent order); Milton Bradley Co., 96 F.T.C.
638 (1980) (consent order); American Art Clay Co., 96 F.T.C. 809 (1980) (consent order).
182. Milton Bradley Co., [1979-1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21, 698, at 21,880;
see also Benjamin S. Sharp, FTC Antitrust Remedies: In the Classic Tradition, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 83,
92-93 (1982) (deputy director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition set out case for using section 19 to
win redress in antitrust proceedings).
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maiden use of Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to obtain antitrust restitution occurred in 1992, when two leading U.S. manufacturers of infant formula agreed
to give 3.6 million pounds of powered infant formula to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture for use in the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, In183
fants, and Children. Then-Chairwoman Janet Steiger described antitrust res184
titution as “a useful tool,” and added that “you may see it used more.” It was
not used again, however, until 1997, when the FTC and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico extracted $300,000 (for the Department of Health) from the College of Physician-Surgeons of Puerto Rico as part of a settlement with that entity and three physician groups that allegedly had engaged in a group boycott to
coerce the Commonwealth into raising reimbursement rates for a Common185
wealth program for providing health care to the uninsured. William Baer, director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, characterized the admittedly
“somewhat novel” restitution as “wholly appropriate,” and added that this
remedy “should be considered in other cases where we can identify an appro186
priate recipient of restitution and the amount of harm.”
With respect to competition cases, as with consumer protection cases, clarity would be desirable. One court has recognized the FTC’s right to use Section
13(b) to win restitution in competition cases, but only against “‘a straightforward violation of section 5 of the FTC Act that required no application of the
FTC’s expertise to a novel regulatory issue through administrative proceed187
188
ings.’”
At one time, this was the FTC’s litigating position.
Perhaps the
FTC should evaluate the standards governing Section 19 of the FTC Act consumer redress provision (would a reasonable person have known that the act or
practice was “dishonest or fraudulent”) as possibly applicable by analogy to
189
other cases. Some announced policy would help. A clearer policy on when to
seek monetary relief would enhance the FTC’s ability to win such relief in
183. See FTC v. Mead Johnson & Co., No. 92-1366 (D.D.C. June 11, 1992) (consent decree), noted
in [FTC Complaints and Orders-1987-1993 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,209); FTC v.
American Home Prods., No. 92-1367 (D.D.C. June 11, 1992) (consent decree), noted in [FTC Complaints and Orders-1987-1993 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,209. The third leading
infant formula firm failed to persuade the district court that this was an inappropriate kind of case for
the FTC to file, see FTC v. Abbott Lab., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,996 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1992)
(denying motion to dismiss), but succeeded in persuading the court that the FTC had failed to sustain
its case, see FTC v. Abbott Lab., 853 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1994).
184. Michael L. Denger et al., 60 Minutes with the Honorable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal
Trade Commission, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 300 (1994). For an earlier, over-optimistic forecast of the
use of section 13(b) in antitrust cases, see Andrew J. Strenio, Jr., Why Thirteen Should be a Lucky
Number for Victims of Price-Fixing, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 149 (1988).
185. See FTC v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, No. 972466 (D.P.R. Oct 2, 1997).
186. William J. Baer, New Myths and Old Realities: Perspectives on Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Before the Bar Association of the City of New York, at 10 (Nov. 17,
1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/banyhtm>.
187. FTC v. Abbott Lab., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,996 (D.D.C. 1992) (denying motion to
dismiss) (“Federal Courts have shied away from accepting direct court actions by the Commission,
such as this, if the offending conduct interjects the court into areas of Commission expertise involving
the creation and monitoring of new concepts of unfair competitive trade practice.”).
188. See FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,725, at 69,705-06
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (summarizing FTC position but rejecting it as too expansive).
189. Cf. id. at 69,705 (reading one authority in light of the other).
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competition cases. It also would reassure observers that the FTC is choosing
between monetary penalties and other alternatives based on firm principles and
not just litigation exigencies.
Development of FTC-imposed monetary consequences for anticompetitive
acts seems eminently desirable, and might give the FTC a comparative advantage over the Antitrust Division in challenging non-criminal anticompetitive
190
acts.
It is less obvious how, without legislation, the Division should begin
constructing “middle ground” deterrence. Perhaps the Division should follow
the FTC’s lead by seeking to obtain consumer redress as ancillary relief to permanent injunctions. Alternatively, perhaps the Division should, at some point
in a civil proceeding against a clear violation, consider referring the matter to
the FTC.
Development of civil government-initiated consequences for antitrust violations might have benefits beyond deterrence. It could lay the groundwork for
making practicable a rethinking of the use of corporate criminal antitrust penalties. At present, criminal penalties are the only viable deterrent. Until the
191
use of civil penalties is expanded, debates about reducing criminal penalties
will be exclusively academic.
C. Continue to Emphasize Individual Liability
As a matter of theory and fact, penalizing individuals is singularly effective.
Further, criminal individual liability carries with it none of the awkwardness of
corporate criminality. Good things follow when individuals need to worry that
fixing prices may make them a felon, and that playing a leading role in causing
192
fraud may have serious personal consequences.
Insisting on individual liability is not always easy. Many corporations resist
“sacrificing” high-ranking individuals. Companies may be more willing to inflict a comparatively trivial financial penalty on every shareholder (most of
whom are anonymous) than a massive punishment on one particular individual,
especially if that individual is a long-valued and appreciated leader. Conversely, government agencies that wage annual appropriations fights may suspect that their budget woes are more likely to be eased through huge corporate
fines193 than through imprisonment or much smaller individual fines. The Antitrust Division, which has consistently emphasized the importance of individual
194
criminal liability and has indicted about as many individuals as corporations,
should be commended for proceeding in litigation against individuals involved

190. Development of competition-based consumer redress would also permit the FTC to draw upon
its consumer protection expertise to enhance its competition program. For an innovative prescription
for further blending these two programs, see Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997).
191. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 53-66.
193. See supra note 23. Any connection between receipt of fines and budget relief is only indirect,
since fines are paid by the U.S. Treasury and are included in general federal revenues.
194. See supra Table 2.
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195

in the Archer Daniels Midland matter, and it should be encouraged to maintain and improve its commitment to indict individuals. It would be unfortunate
were the Division’s desire to reach more substantial firms to lead it to relax its
commitment to reach more than merely the firms. Similarly, the FTC should
continue to seek remedies against the individuals who play leading roles in
196
causing serious consumer fraud.
D. Coordinate Sanctions
From a deterrence perspective, it make no difference whether payments are
197
It is unfortunate that the
made to the U.S. Treasury, states, or consumers.
Sentencing Guidelines failed to recognize this and do not permit coordination
198
199
of penalties. Given that federal and state enforcers are increasingly allied,
the only sensible course is to seek to coordinate penalties.
The obvious benefits of coordinating penalties have not gone unrecognized.
The Antitrust Division conditions its grant of corporate leniency on, among
other things, a corporation’s making “restitution to injured parties” where pos200
sible. The Division thus seeks to ensure that a corporation cannot confess to
wrongdoing while retaining the fruits thereof. Conversely, it is when remedial
action by private parties of state attorneys general is not likely to be forthcoming that FTC antitrust restitution is most appropriate, in the view of FTC
201
Chairman Steiger.

195. See Former ADM official Is Indicted for Defrauding Lysine Firm of $9 Million, 72 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 78 (Jan. 23, 1997).
In a breakthrough capitulation, Archer-Daniels-Midland pled guilty to participating in international conspiracies to fix the prices of lysine and citric acid, and paid a $100 million corporate fine—the
largest criminal antitrust fine in history. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. to
Plead Guilty and Pay $100 Million for Role in Two International Price-Fixing Conspiracies (Oct. 15,
1996) available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/press_releases/1996press/573at.htm>; see also Klein, Anticipating the Millennium, supra note 70 (reviewing the Division’s food additives price-fixing investigation).
196. Because many of the firms the FTC attacks for having perpetrated frauds have little existence
beyond their principals, there is less need to trade-off and individual penalties. The real question confronting the FTC is often only how far down the chain of corporate control to go.
197. See, e.g., Richard Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365,
392 (1970) (noting that it is “difficult to disentangle the deterrent effects” of criminal penalties and the
punitive portion of treble damages).
198. Mark Cohen found that, in his 1984-90 sample, judges imposed slightly smaller criminal penalties when expected civil penalties were large. Cohen, supra note 3, at 405-06.
199. Coordination can also occur at the permissive end of the sale, if the FTC uses Section 5, which
does not confer a private right of action, to challenge activity that harms competition but for which it
would be dangerous to permit private suits seeking money damages.
200. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 10, 1993), available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/Guidelines/lencorp.txt>); see also Spratling, supra note 59 (elaborating on
this requirement).
201. See Denger, et al., supra note 184, at 300 (describing her vision of the ideal case for FTC antitrust restitution, which would also have clear, measurable consumer injury from a serious violation).
Fudging the question of timing, Chairman Steiger first said their should be “a possibility that the party
is not subject to any other kind of remedial action,” and then explained that she would want a situation
where private litigation “would not correct the problem and where the [s]tates could not act as parens
patriae.” Id. A similar list of factors was set out six years earlier by Commissioner Strenio. See
Strenio, supra note 184, at 154-55.
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The FTC took an important step toward increased coordination of penalties
202
in Blue Coral, Inc. The agreement that tentatively resolved this false advertising case expressly reserved to the FTC the right to seek consumer redress,
without respect to any usual statutes of limitation, if the respondents did not
make available consumer redress with a retail value of at least $10 million pur203
suant to class action lawsuits challenging the questioned advertising.
The
FTC also reserved the right to intervene in any such class action lawsuit to oppose a proposed settlement that the FTC “does not deem to be in the public interest” (with the important exception that the FTC may not object to the
amount of any settlement for which the “aggregate retail value” is at least $10
204
million). The FTC’s resolution of this dispute thus allowed the agency to play
an important role in identifying and ending misleading advertising, while letting
private litigants take the lead in extracting compensation and, in theory, imposing penalties on the wrongdoers, with the FTC standing by in case the pri205
vate litigation failed to accomplish this objective.
There will be times when private or state attorney general litigation may be
206
a superior vehicle for aiding persons injured by illegal activity; there will be
times when the efficient course is entirely federal. The important thing is that
207
there be sufficient (but not excessive) total deterrence.

202. No. 9280 (Dec. 9, 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9712/bluecora.d&o.htm>.
203. See Blue Coral, Inc., No. 9280, at 1-2 (July 23, 1997) (agreement containing consent order to
cease and desist), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9707/bluecora.htm>.
204. Id. at 6.
205. The penalizing of wrongdoers may turn out to be more theoretical than real because the FTC’s
agreement unfortunately allows the respondents’ goods and services (although not exclusively for the
engine treatment the advertising of which had been questioned). See id. See generally Calkins, supra
note 91, at 442 (controversy over coupon-based settlements).
206. Cf. David J. Morrow, Transporting Lawsuits Across State Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at
A1 (quoting Eileen Harrington, FTC Associate Director of the Bureau of Consumer: “‘The states have
become our most valuable law enforcement partners. Sometimes we follow them on certain issues and
then they follow us on others.’”). The increased use of state parens patriae authority is discussed in
Calkins, supra note 3, at 433-37.
207. See, e.g., Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72 (where corporate frauds have few external effects, optimal penalties, which include sanctions and reputation effects, should equal the social cost of the
fraud); see also Becker, supra note 8 (theory of optimal deterrence).

